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AERIAL SURVEILLANCE AND THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT
INTRODUCTION

The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that "[tIhe right of the people to be secure.. . against
unreasonable searches . . . shall not be violated."' For some
time, 2 both federal and state courts have been confronted with
the application of the fourth amendment proscription of unreasonable searches to a new police activity: the use of aircraft to
observe and search property.3 Additionally, the use of satellites
as a variation of the airbom search has recently begun and will
4
probably face fourth amendment challenge in the near future.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. In full, the amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id. See also infra note 30.
2. The first reported decision on airborn searches was in 1973: People
v. Sneed, 32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1973) (the use of a helicopter to search defendant's property for marijuana held to be unreasonable);
see also, Comment, Police Helicopter Surveillance, 15 ARIz. L. REV. 145
(1973) (a comment written prior to the first reported case).
The earliest reported instances of aerial surveillance involved military
observations. During the spring of 1862, Professor Thaddeus Lowe used a
hot air balloon to observe Confederate positions for the Federal army during the penisula campaign. Porter, Hanover Court House and Gaines' Mill,
in BATrLES AND LEADERS OF THE CIVIL WAR II 321 (1956); see also Goss,
Yorktown and Williamsburg, in BArLES AND LEADERS, supra, at 193-94.
3. The scope of this comment is limited to the use of aircraft as searching tools. This includes observation and searching whether intentional or
inadvertant, regardless of whether the search was conducted specifically or
was of a more general nature. However, it is not within the scope of this
comment to discuss general aerial surveillance techniques such as the observation and trailing of suspect automobiles, aircraft, or boats.
Similarly, this comment will not discuss probable cause or other warrant requirements, but rather, will deal solely with the validity of warrantless aerial surveillance. The searches examined herein, were conducted
without warrants and were absent any of the exigencies normally used to
overcome fourth amendment warrant requirements. The focus of this comment is to examine under what circumstances aerial surveillance amounts
to an unreasonable warrantless search.
4. "The Reagan administration's task force on drug traffickers is, for
the first time in law enforcement history, using Pentagon, CIA and NASA
satellites to spy on narcotics operations . . . ." Chicago Tribune, Jan. 23,
1983, at 1, col. 5. The major fourth amendment concern raised is "that the
U.S. has used civilian and military satellites to detect marijuana fields in
the [United States]." Id. Constitutional disputes arising out of this activity
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Constitutionally, the question is one of balancing the conflicting
interests of the individual's legitimate desire for freedom from
governmental intrusion against government's legitimate law enforcement needs.
THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The fourth amendment requires a two-step approach for
testing the constitutionality of police search procedures. 5 Initially, this analysis establishes the point at which an airborn police activity is tantamount to a search;6 then, whether the search
was reasonable under the circumstances. 7 This two-stepped approach is as applicable to the unobtrusive aircraft as to the more
traditional constable at the door. 8 This comment examines aircraft surveillance in the context of the traditional two-step analysis and concludes with an examination of the fourth
amendment's application to satellite surveillance. 9 Initially
however, this comment examines the purposes underlying the
will probably enter the court system soon, and the Justice Department
views this satellite surveillance as a reasonable governmental intrusion:
"Jay Stevens, counselor to the Justice Department's criminal division, said
that the use of satellite pictures to spot illegal crops or other operations is
consistent with the constitutional guarantees against unreasonable
searches and seizures because of the 'plain view doctrine' established in
other cases." Id. at 8, col. 6. For further discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 176-87.
5. The fourth amendment requires a two-step analysis. "Central to an
understanding of the Fourth Amendment, therefore, is a perception of what
police activities, under what circumstances . . .

,

constitute . . . a search

...within the meaning of... [the] Amendment." W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE, A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 2.1, 221 (1978). Following a determination that a police activity amounts to a search, the activity
must be analyzed as to its reasonableness. That reasonableness analysis is
the usual focus in fourth amendment cases.
6. There are numerous methods of determining what constitutes a
search, however, this discussion will address whether a search has occurred
based on what was the questioned police activity; analyzing what the police
were doing. For a discussion of whether or when aerial surveillance
amounts to a search, see infra text accompanying notes 87-137.
7. The test applied to the reasonableness of a search is whether there
was a reasonable expectation of privacy which was violated. The reasonable expectation of privacy test could be applied to determine either
whether a search has occurred or the reasonableness of that search. However, it appears more logical to initially establish whether specific governmental activity rises to the level of a constitutional search, then to apply the
reasonable expectation of privacy test to determine the reasonableness of
that search. See infra text accompanying notes 138-75.
8. "Expectations of privacy are not earthbound. The Fourth Amendment guards the privacy of human activity from aerial no less than terrestrial invasion." Dean v. Superior Court for County of Nevada, 35 Cal. App.
3d 112, 116, 110 Cal. Rptr. 585, 588 (1973).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 176-87.
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constitutional prohibition' before proceeding to the amendment's current application.1 '
To Be Secure: Its Origin and Meaning
The right to be secure from unreasonable governmental intrusion is not only a basic constitutional guarantee, but also a
fundamental common-law right.' 2 The fourth amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches did not grant a new right, but
rather, secured a traditional right from the possibility of future
governmental encroachment. 13 This guarantee, while originally
held to be a constant, is now viewed as flexible and adaptable to
various situations. This flexibility arose, in part, as a response
to the increased searching capabilities that technological ad4
vances have offered to the police.'
The fourth amendment, like most other protections consti10. See infra text accompanying notes 12-60.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 61-83.
12. United States v. Crosby, 25 F. Cas. 701 (S.C. Cir. 1871) (No. 14,893)
(right to be secure in one's home existed at common law long before Constitution); see Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir.) (tort of invasion of
privacy properly includes action for unreasonable search), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 947 (1969); see also Neuslein v. District of Columbia, 115 F.2d 690 (D.C.
Cir. 1940) (fourth amendment was enacted against common law background of general warrants and writs of assistance); United States v. Solomon, 33 F.2d 193 (Mass. Cir. 1929) (under long standing common law
precepts, officer may search and seize instrumentalities of crime incident to
lawful arrest); United States v. Three Tons Coal, 28 F. Cas. 149 (D. Wis.
1875) (No. 16,515) (American colonies were protected from unreasonable
searches by common law).
13. Bell v. Hood, 71 F. Supp. 813 (D. Cal. 1947); but compare with the
English protection: "In certain limited circumstances an officer of police
not below the rank of superintendent may give to a constable written authority to search premises for stolen goods. Under this authority a constable may enter the premises accordingly and seize any goods he believes to
be stolen goods." HALSBURY'S LAws OF ENGLAND, H at para. 123. "Powers of
search without warrant are conferred on constables by, for example, the
statutes referred to below." Id. (emphasis added). Examples then followed refering to firearms violations, drug offenses, airports, terrorism, and
animal protection. See also Davey, US v. Britain: A Contrast in Police Authority, 17 TRLAL 48, 48-52 (Oct. 1981) (general comparison of British and
American civil liberties and the greater protection provided by the United
States' Bill of Rights).
14. Both official and private wiretapping were known of prior to the
twentieth century. Statutes prohibiting wiretaps (police or private) were
enacted in Illinois and New York in 1895, police observance of these statutory prohibitions was casual at best. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 46
(1967); see W. THAYER, THEODORE ROOSEVELT 359 (1919) (refering to the
wiretapping of the long distance phone lines used to keep Roosevelt informed during the Republican nominating convention); see also J.
BAMFORD, THE PUZZLE PALACE 6-19 (1982) (for a discussion of the regularity
and ease of communications interception during the period when all communications were earthbound).

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 17:455

tutionally incorporated by the Bill of Rights,' 5 arose from both
American colonial and English antecedents. 16 The requirement
that a warrant be issued before a search could be conducted was
a relatively old practice predating the Constitution by several
15. The fourth amendment took effect in 1791, however, President
Washington had actually announced Rhode Island's (the ninth and hence
completing state's) ratification to Congress on June 30, 1790. F. THORPE,
THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 11, 261 (1901). The
adoption of the Bill of Rights led to the incorporation of those included
rights into the Constitution. Additionally, the fourth amendment was held
applicable to the states by "incorporation" into the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of "due process." Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
("[T he Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States, . . the right
to be secure ... is, therefore, constitutional in origin. . . ." Id. at 660). See
also, Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949) (while not holding the fourth
amendment applicable to the states, hinting in dictum, "that were a State
affirmatively to sanction such police incursion into privacy it would run
counter to the guaranty of the Fourteenth Amendment."). In apparent contradiction is Wolf s holding: "[I] n a prosecution in a State court for a State
crime the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid the admission of evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure." Id. at 33. See also,
Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 134 (1954) (stating that not until Wolf did
the Supreme Court "hold the basic search-and-seizure prohibition in any
way applicable to the States under the Fourteenth Amendment.").
Prior to Mapp, Wolf, and Irvine, the fourth amendment, as with the rest
of the Bill of Rights generally, was held inapplicable to state action. The
fourth amendment was held to be merely a restraint "upon the United
States itself." United States v. Crosby, 25 F. Cas. 701, 704 (S.C. Cir. 1871)
(No. 14,893); see, e.g., Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833).
"These amendments [the Bill of Rights] contain no expression indicating
an intention to apply them to the state governments. This Court cannot so
apply them." Id. at 250. See also Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131 (1887).
"IT]he first ten Articles of Amendment were not intended to limit the powers of the state governments in respect to their own people, but to operate
on the National Government alone ... ." Id. at 166; Smith v. Maryland, 59
U.S. (18 How.) 71, 76 (1855) (states not subject to the fourth amendment so
their warrants need not be based on oath or affirmation); Fox v. Ohio, 46
U.S. (5 How. 410) 480 (1846). The amendments "are exclusively restrictions
upon federal power, intended to prevent interference with the rights of the

States, and of their citizens." Id. at (434) 508. See also AMERICAN

AND ENG-

LISH ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAw, XXI, 955, 956-57 n.3 (1891).

'The provision
[the fourth amendment] in the Federal Constitution is held not to apply to
the State governments, but is a limitation upon federal powers." Id. at 95657 n. 3. Due to the inapplicability of the Bill of Rights to state action, most
state constitutions contained their own prohibitions of unreasonable
searches. See infra note 29.
16. Many of the protections incorporated into the American Bill of
Rights were drawn from English antecedents. See, e.g., PETITION OF RIGHT,
para. 3 (Eng. 1689) (guarantee of due process); PETITION OF RIGHT, para. 3
(Eng. 1689) (habeas corpus); PETITION OF RIGHT, para. 4 (Eng. 1689) (prohibition of quartering soldiers in private houses); BILL OF RIGHTS, para. 5
(Eng. 1689) (cruel and unusual punishments and excessive fines and bails

prohibited); MAGNA CARTA, § 39 (1215) (right to trial by jury);
CARTA, § 40 (1215) (right to speedy trial). See generally UNITED

MAGNA
STATES
CONSTrrUTION SESQUICENTENNIAL COMMISSION, HISTORY OF THE FORMATION

OF THE UNION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION

280-328 (S.Bloom

dir.

1941) (for

background, proposals, and discussions leading to the Bill of Rights).
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centuries. 17 However, the protection thus provided was not always significant and during the period immediately preceding
the American Revolution it was recognized that warrants might
be so general, or overbroad, that they might as well "be against
the whole English nation."'1 8 The "general warrants"' 9 in use
prior to the revolutionary period required no specificity. In the
seminal English case of Entick v. Carrington,20 general warrants
were described as being so broad as to be incapable of justification. 21 In Entick, four of the King's messengers were found
guilty of trespassing onto John Entick's property even though
the messengers had been acting under the authority of a search
warrant. 22 The search was conducted in an effort to suppress or
seize political tracts and pamphlets published in opposition to
the British crown. 23 The court, finding the messengers guilty of
trespassing, ruled that the warrant which "authorized" their
search was overbroad and thereby invalid.24 Meanwhile, in
17. Search warrants were cited by Lord Camden in Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 813 (C.P. 1765), as dating from a Star Chamber
decree of 1636 (11 CAR., ch. 4th (1636)), however, that decree cites its authority as derived from a decree of 1586 (28 Euz. (1586)). D. HUTCHISON,
THE FOUNDATION OF THE CONsTrTION

295 (1975).

18. The statement was made by John Wilkes, the plaintiff in Wilkes v.
Wood, 95 Eng. Rep. 767 (C.P. 1763). J. SHATrucK, RIGHTS OF PRIVACY 1
(1977), citing, J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT
28 (1966).
19. The term "general warrant" is used throughout this discussion to
denote warrants issued without particularity; lacking in their description of
persons, places, or things. "General warrants are those that do not name
the person to be seized: practically they are cartes blanches for seizing anyone and everyone." L. WHIPPLE, OUR ANCIENT LIBERTIES 122 (1927).
Parliament declared general warrants illegal in 1766 (6 GEO. III). The
abuse, however, continued in the American colonies, sanctioned by the
writs of assistance. See infra notes 25-26.
20. 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765).
21. John Entick was involved in the publication of two anti-government
papers, The Monitor and The British Freeholder. Although the warrant
specified Entick by name, his papers and books were searched and seized
at the messengers' discretion, therefore, the warrant was found to have
been invalid because of its generality. Id. at 818. See also Wilkes v. Wood,
95 Eng. Rep. 608 (C.P. 1763). In Wilkes, a general warrant was issued to
search and seize anyone involved in the publication of The North Briton, No.
45. Wilkes and forty-eight others were arrested under the authority of the
warrant. The warrant was held invalid due to its generality, in a successful
action against the King's messengers for trespass. Compare, W. LAFAVE,
supra note 5, at § 2.1(a) (examining the American colonial opposition to
general warrants); J. SHATTUCK, supra note 18, at 3-4 (quoting to the remarks of James Otis, Jr., in opposition to general warrants and writs of
assistance in his unsuccessful defense of sixty-three Boston merchants in
Lechmere's Case).
22. Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 817-18 (C.P. 1765).
23. These pieces were considered to have been "crown libels;" libels
against the crown. W. LAFAVE, supra note 5, at § 1.1(a).
24. Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 816-17 (C.P. 1765).

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 17:455

America, opposition to general warrants focused on the use of
25
"writs of assistance" in duty collections.
Writs of assistance enabled customs officers to conduct
broad searches for contraband or smuggled goods with little or
no justification. 26 Additionally, general warrants were used in
colonial America; the warrants were issued as blanks under a
magistrate's authority, the specifics were then filled in at the
time of use.2 7 Colonial opposition to general warrants and writs
of assistance is often cited as one of the primary causes of the
American Revolution. 28 This opposition was reflected by constitutional prohibitions of unreasonable searches enacted by seven
29
states prior to the adoption of the fourth amendment.
25. [The writ of assistance] appears to me the worst instrument of
arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty and the fundamental principles of law that ever was found in an English lawbook...
the writ ... being general, is illegal. It is a power that places the liberty
of every man in the hands of every petty officer.
J. SHATTUCK, supra note 18, at 4, quoting, C. ADAMS, THE LIFE AND WORKS OF
JOHN ADAMS, 11, 471 (1856), quoting, James Otis, Jr., closing from Lechmere's
Case.
26. A person with this writ, in the daytime, may enter all houses,
shops, and so on at will, and command all to assist him ....
Now one
of the most essential branches of English liberty is the freedom of one's
house. A man's house is his castle, and whilst he is quiet he is as well
guarded as a prince in his castle.
J. SHATTUCK supra note 18, at 4, quoting, C. ADAMs, supra note 25, at 471,
quoting, James Otis, Jr., in Lechmere's Case. The grant of authority for the
issuance of writs of assistance was:
[Ilt shall be lawful ... for any person ... authorized by writ of assistance under the seal of his Majesty's Court of Exchequer ... to enter
...any house, shop, cellar, warehouse, or room, or other place;...
there to seize, and from thence to bring any kind of goods or merchandise whatsoever, prohibited or uncustomed, and to put and secure same
in his Majesty's storehouse ....
13 & 14 CAR. II, ch. llth (1673-74). Writs of assistance were derived largely
from medieval duty and fealty owed by knights to the king, hence, their
assistance being drawn by writ of the king. This traditional demand of aid
and service is closely related to the posse comitatus power, for a contemporary irony, see infra notes 182-85 and accompanying text.
27. Historically, the rule [the fourth amendment] grew out of the
American colonists' distaste for the practices of the English troops stationed in the colonies. These troops were aided by the "Writs of Assistance," general warrants which were signed in blank ... and authorized
a search of anyone whose name the soldiers wrote on the warrant.
L. WHIPPLE, supra note 19, at 49; see also, C. BEARD &M. BEARD, THE RISE OF
AMERICAN CIVILIZATION 219-20 (1930).
28. B. SCHwARTz, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, I, 182-

94 (1971) (discussion of Lechmere's Case and the underlying colonial opposition to general searching power); see, e.g., C. BEARD & M. BEARD, supra
note 27, at 216-20; L. WHIPPLE, supra note 19, at 48-50; J. SHATTUCK, supra
note 18, at 1-4; SESQUICENTENNIAL COMMISSION, supra note 16, at 284.
29. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, § 17 (Del. 1776); DECLARATION OF RIGHTS,
art. XXIII (Md. 1776); DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. XIV (Mass. 1780); BILL
OF RIGHTS, art. XIX (N.H. 1783); DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, § 8 (Pa. 1776);
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. XI

(Vt.

1777); DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. I
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The fourth amendment, as ratified, was phrased in two independent clauses. 30 The first clause guarantees each person's
right to be secure from unreasonable searches, 3 1 while the second clause established, conceptually, the necessary criteria for
the issuance of warrants. 32 The relationship, if any, between
these two clauses has troubled the courts throughout this cen§ 10 (Va. 1776). See similarly, THE

RIGHTS OF COLONISTS AND A LIST OF INFRINGEMENTS AND VIOLATIONS OF RIGHTS, § 4 (attributed to S. Adams, 1772);
and the anti-Federalist writings: R.H. LEE, LETTER IV, 11 (1787); E. GERRY,

OBSERVATIONS ON THE NEW CONSTITUTION AND THE FEDERAL AND STATE CON8 (1788).
VENTIONS, § 14 (1788); LETTERS OF BRUTUS, I,
Additionally, the constitutional ratifying conventions of six states requested that an amendment prohibiting unreasonable searches be enacted
(Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and
Virginia). B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 28, at 665, 681, 733-34, 765, 913, & 968.
30. The fourth amendment is construed as first barring unreasonable
searches and, secondly, as providing the basic guidelines for the sufficiency
of a warrant. See infra notes 31 & 32.
When James Madison introduced what would eventually become the
fourth amendment into the House of Representatives, the phrasing was integrated into a single prohibition:
The rights of the people to be secured in their persons, their houses,
their papers, and their other property, from all unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated by warrants issued without probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, or not particularly describing
the places to be searched, or the persons or things to be seized.
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 434-35 (J. Gales, ed. 1789) (emphasis added to indicate
the original singularity of phrasing).
The amendment as passed by the House of Representatives bore more
semblance to the eventual fourth amendment as enacted, however, it still
maintained the integrated structure:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable seizures and searches, shall not be violated by warrantsissuing without probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and not particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
Id. at 754. The final wording of the fourth amendment was eventually arrived at by a congressional conference committee. Compare supra note 1.
31. The first part of the fourth amendment bars only unreasonable
searches, implying that there can be reasonable searches. However, warrantless searches are generally suspect as likely to be unreasonable. The
major exceptions are in situations where the search was conducted incident
to a lawful arrest, a search in response to recognizably exigent circumstances, and searches conducted in the interests of national security. These
exceptions are complexly mired in fourth amendment case law, however,
they need not necessarily concern this discussion of aerial surveillance except, tangentially perhaps, the national security exception. Rather, the concern of this comment will focus on whether aerial surveillance should, on its
own, qualify for a fourth amendment exception or be exempt under the
"plain view," "open view," or "open fields" exceptions.
32. The second part of the fourth amendment, the warrant requirements, is not of a concern in this discussion of aerial surveillance except as
to the underlying presumption that some airborn searches may be violative
of the fourth amendment in the absence of a warrant.

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 17:455

tury. 33 This discussion, however, is limited in scope to the first
clause and attempts to identify the point at which police conduct amounts to a search and then the point at which a police
search becomes unreasonable.
The application of the fourth amendment originally paralleled English property protections. 34 Freedom from unreasonable searches bears a natural and easily recognized relationship
to traditional property and trespass law 35 and, to some extent,
property concepts are still applied. 36 However, this property oriented protection did not run uniformily throughout an individual's land. Rather, the individual's interest, his right to be
secure from governmental intrusions,37 was held to be greatest
33. Courts have stated that warrantless searches are intrinsically unreasonable and that the state must prove that the search is within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement.

However, as the sheer

quantity of fourth amendment cases increases, courts are increasingly wont
to apply warrant exceptions routinely and automatically. See, e.g., United

States v. Hall, 348 F.2d 837 (2nd Cir.) (arrest without a warrant even though
there was an opportunity to obtain one), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 947 (1965).
34. See, Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 817 (C.P. 1765) ("[Our
law holds the property of every man so sacred, that no man can set his foot
upon his neighbor's close without his leave;"); Elsee v. Smith, 1 Dow & Ry.
97(K.B. 1822) (the sanctity of property requires, minimally, probable cause
before a warrant is issued); Wyatt v. White, 157 Eng. Rep. 1226 (L.J. Ex.
1860) (property interests may not be invaded by false warrants, there must
be a showing of probable cause).
35. The concept of searching is intrinsically tied to a person's property
interest. In the absence of a right in the property to be searched, a person
may not be able to exert a claim for the protection of that property. Jones v.
United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), overruled, United States v. Saloucci, 448
U.S. 83 (1980). But see, Parman v. United States, 399 F.2d 559 (D.C. Cir.
1968) (subtleties of property law need not determine the outcome of a
fourth amendment analysis), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 858; Maxwell v. Stephens, 348 F.2d 325 (8th Cir.) (property and trespass law are not necessarily
determinative in fourth amendment analysis), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 944
(1965).
36. Property concepts still have a logical application under the Katz
reasonable expectation of privacy test; an individual may reasonably have a
higher expectation of privacy within his dwelling than when out in his yard.
See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 633 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1980) (aerial surveillance was not unreasonable when the searching aircraft did not fly over the
defendant's property lines), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 833 (1981); State v. Davis,
51 Or. App. 827, 627 P.2d 492 (1981) (reversal of trial court's exclusion of
evidence; trial court had excluded evidence derived from aerial surveillance
that had intruded into the defendant's airspace at 600 feet); People v.
Sneed, 32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1973) (aerial surveillance held
unreasonable when conducted at an altitude of 25 feet; it was found offensive to both property and privacy interests).
37. The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the force
of the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow
through it; the storm may enter; the rain may enter; but the King of
England may not enter; all his force dares not cross the threshold of the
ruined tenement.
N. LAsSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO

THE UNITED STATES CONsTrrTrON 49-50 (1937)

(quoting William Pitt). See
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within his dwelling. 38 The individual's privacy interest was held
to the distance of the area
to diminish in direct relation
39
dwelling.
the
from
searched
This property determinative view of the fourth amendment
recognized at least three distinct types of "land" to be protected:
the dwelling, 40 the curtilage, 4 1 and the outlying property. 42 The
also Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (freedom from
intrusion is the interest protected by the fourth amendment); United States
v. Croft, 429 F.2d 884 (10th Cir. 1970) (right of privacy and freedom from
governmental intrusion are the rights protected by the fourth amendment);
United States v. Missler, 414 F.2d 1293 (4th Cir. 1969) (fourth amendment
protects people from governmental intrusions), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913
(1970).
38. Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970) (the sanctity of the dwelling is
guaranteed by the fourth amendment and can only be violated in reaction
to certain specific exigencies). See, e.g., Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d
385 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (nonforceable, unconsented, warrantless entry not violative of fourth amendment when in furtherance of objective of arresting
probable armed felon); see also infra note 50.
39. McDowell v. United States, 383 F.2d 599 (8th Cir. 1967) (proximity of
the area to be searched to the dwelling is a factor to be considered in fourth
amendment analysis); Rosencranz v. United States, 356 F.2d 310 (1st Cir.
1966) (immediacy of dwelling to area searched should be considered); Care
v. United States, 231 F.2d 22 (10th Cir.) (protection afforded area determined by the area's proximity or annexation to the dwelling), cert. denied,
351 U.S. 932 (1956). See W. LAFAVE, supra note 5, at § 2.3.
40. Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970) (absent specific exceptions or
exigencies, the warrantless search of a dwelling is violative of the fourth
amendment). See also Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765).
[NIo power can lawfully break into a man's house and study to search
for evidence against him; this would be worse than the Spanish Inquisition; for ransacking a man's secret drawers and boxes to come at evidence against him, is like racking his body to come at his secret
thoughts.
Id. at 812.
41. United States v. Molkenbur, 430 F.2d 563 (8th Cir.) (fourth amendment protection extends throughout the curtilage), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 952
(1970); United States ex rel. Boyance v. Myers, 398 F.2d 896 (3rd Cir. 1968)
(curtilage is a protected area); Fullbright v. United States, 392 F.2d 432 (10th
Cir.) (protection of "houses" extends to the curtilage), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
830 (1968); McDowell v. United States, 383 F.2d 599 (8th Cir. 1967) (curtilage
is a protected area); Rosencranz v. United States, 356 F.2d 310 (1st Cir. 1966)
("house" includes curtilage); Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22 (10th Cir.)
(protection of "houses" extends throughout curtilage), cert. denied, 351 U.S.
932 (1956).
42. The property lying beyond the curtilage has been afforded little or
no protection. United States v. Capps, 435 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1970) (no protection beyond the curtilage, even for areas adjacent to the curtilage);
United States v. Hollon, 420 F.2d 302 (5th Cir. 1969) (no warrant required to
search areas beyond the curtilage); McDowell v. United States, 383 F.2d 599
(8th Cir. 1967) (area one-quarter mile from the curtilage was not protected);
United States v. Sorce, 325 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1963) (mere physical break of a
property boundary does not automatically make a search unreasonable),
cert. denied, 376 U.S. 931 (1964); Monnette v. United States, 299 F.2d 847 (5th
Cir. 1962) (fourth amendment does not extend to the property grounds);
United States v. LaBerge, 267 F. Supp. 686 (D. Md. 1967) (fourth amendment
does not protect property outside of the curtilage).
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dwelling was limited to "habitable structures. ' 43 The curtilage,
a medieval concept, originally encompassed the castle or keep.
It is now generally defined as the area of buildings and yards
immediately surrounding the dwelling." The remaining property falls into a final, least protected area; this area beyond the
curtilage is often called the "open fields." The use of the term
open fields is unfortunate because the phrase has grown to have
a special fourth amendment significance.
The lessened security provided to open fields was first enunciated in Hester v. United States.45 In Hester, the Supreme
Court held that it was not unreasonable for the police to have
searched the fields around the defendant's dwelling without a
warrant.4 6 The open fields exception to the fourth amendment
43. The fourth amendment specifically includes "houses."
Indeed, one's dwelling has generally been viewed as the area most resolutely protected by the Fourth Amendment. 'At the very core,' the
Court cautioned in Silverman v. United States [365 U.S. 505 (1961)],
'stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free
from unreasonable governmental intrusion.' This constitutional protection of houses has been extended to other residential premises as well,
including apartments, hotel and motel rooms, and rooms in rooming
houses.
W. LAFAVE, Supra note 5,§ 2.3 at 290-91 (citations omitted). Dwellings are of
no real concern to this comment since they are virtually immune to airborn
surveillance techniques. For further discussion of what constitutes a
"house" under the fourth amendment, see W. LAFAVE, supra note 5, at § 2.3.
44. The sanctity of the curtilage arose from the medieval enclosure of
property. The curtilage is often defined as the area enclosed by the "curtain
walls" but excluding the manor hall/dwelling. In that situation, the sanctity
of the curtilage was physically manifested by the integrity of the castle
walls. J. &F. GIEs, LIFE IN A MEDIEVAL CASTLE 26, 27 (1974). The curtilage's
sanctity survived the practical demise of castles and is now generally considered as including the yards and buildings surrounding or identified with
a dwelling. "[I]t is bizarre that the curious concept of curtilage, originally
taken to refer to the land and buildings within the baron's stone walls,
should ever have been deemed to be of controlling significance as to the
constitutional limits upon the powers of the police." W. LAFAVE, supra note
5, § 2.3 at 314.
For a contemporary application of the curtilage concept, after-Katz,
see, e.g., United States v. Molkenbur, 430 F.2d 563 (8th Cir.) (protection of
the curtilage is similar to that of the dwelling), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 952
(1970); United States ex rel. Boyance v. Myers, 398 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1968)
(curtilage includes the grounds and buildings immediately surrounding the
dwelling). See also Kishel v. State, 287 So.2d 414 (Fla. App. 1974) (buildings
in close proximity to the dwelling protected as curtilage); McGee v. State,
133 GA. App. 184, 210 S.E.2d 355 (1974) (proximity of outlying farm buildings
to dwelling accords them fourth amendment protection). But see People v.
Weisenberger, 183 Colo. 353, 516 P.2d 1128 (1973) (protection within the curtilage was reliant upon reasonable expectation of privacy); State v. Vicars,
207 Neb. 325, 299 N.W.2d 421 (1980) (curtilage's protection depends upon
Katz analysis).
45. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
46. Hester involved a prohibition era search for bootleg liquor. Federal
agents were observing the defendant who was outside on his father's property. Id. at 58. The defendant became alarmed and hid, dropped, or threw
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is still valid and the fourth amendment provides little or no pro47
tection for individuals, activities, or objects in such an area. It
is of obvious importance, therefore, to define what is meant by
open fields. To some courts, all areas outside of the curtilage are
open fields.48 Other courts, however, have taken a more logical
approach in determining what constitutes open fields. Their
analysis is based on the subjective actions of the property owner: if a property owner fences or posts his property, it should not
still legitimately be considered open fields and thus, is no longer
49
open to at will police incursions.
Additionally, open fields must be distinguished from "open
view" and "plain view." Within the confines of this discussion,
each will be individually defined and used regardless of their
definition, or misdefinition, by various courts. Open fields, as
stated previously, includes the property outside the curtilage
two jugs into one of his father's nearby fields. Id. The field was subsequently searched without a warrant and the jugs were found; they contained "moonshine." Id. The Supreme Court then carved out a special
exception to fourth amendment protection, stating that "the special protection accorded ... to the people in their 'persons, houses, papers and effects,' is not extended to the open fields." Id. at 59. In this Katz' reasonable
expectation of privacy era, the Supreme Court has noted Hester's continued
vitality on several occasions. See, e.g., Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861 (1974) (citing Hester with apparent approval);
Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973) (continuing vitality of Hester). But
see, United States v. Knotts, 103 S. Ct. 1081, 1088 (1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (four justice concurrence refused to find Hester applicable.
47. In one post-Katz case, systematic excavations in a search for a body
was held valid since the digging occurred about four hundred and fifty feet
from the dwelling. Conrad v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 616, 218 N.W.2d 252 (1974).
The Conrad court, assuming an overly restrictive furth amendment approach, reasoned that Katz "reinforced the position of Justice Holmes in
Hester that a place is not per se protected against an unreasonable search
....

An open field remains beyond the ambit of the Fourth Amendment

...."Id. at 623, 218 N.W.2d at 258.
48. See e.g., United States v. Baldwin, 691 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1982) (traditional curtilage includes "residence and its appurtenances"); Patler v. Slayton, 503 F.2d 472 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v. Brown, 473 F.2d 952 (5th
Cir. 1973) (chicken coop on abandoned farm within open fields); United
States v. Swann, 377 F. Supp. 1305 (D. Md. 1974) (pond several hundred
yards from barn was outside curtilage); see also, United States v. Knotts,
103 S. Ct. 1081 (1983) (citing Hester as authority in tracking device case); but
see, United States v. Knotts, 103 S. Ct. at 1088 (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(fourt justices, while specifically concurring in the result of Knotts, declined to apply the open fields of Hester).
49. People v. Terrell, 53 Misc.2d 32, 277 N.Y.S.2d 926 (1967), affid, 30
A.D.2d 644, 291 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (1968) (distinction drawn between fenced or
posted lands and open lands); see also United States v. Sterling, 244 F.
Supp. 534 (W.D. Pa. 1965), affd, 369 F.2d 799 (3rd Cir. 1966) (fourth amendment unoffended by reasonable but ignorant trespass onto unfenced, unmarked land); Edwards v. United States, 206 F.2d 855 (10th Cir. 1953) (open
lands are unprotected by the fourth amendment); but see, United States v.
Hassell, 336 F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 1964) (knowing trespass not necessarily offensive to the fourth amendment), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 965 (1965).
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and, further, it should be limited to that property "open" to public or police intrusions. "Plain view" denotes that view provided
police incident to a lawful entry or arrest.5 0

"Open view" is any

view of property absent police entry onto the property. 51 Thus,
the plain view incident to a lawful entry or arrest is of little importance to a discussion of aerial surveillance. It is the purpose
of aerial surveillance to provide police with an advantageous
view point in the absence of any entry onto property.
Because the reasonableness of a search often depends upon
the position of the searching officer, it becomes necessary to establish many subjective property features: whether the property was open to licensees or invitees;5 2 whether the property
was accessable to neighbors;5 3 whether the property was view54
able from another's private land or from a public right-of-way;
whether people were visible or audible from outside the property 55 whether there was a physical trespass; 5 6 or, where the po50. What the 'plain view' cases have in common is that the police of-

ficer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the

course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior
justification-whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit,
search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accusedand permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the
original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent
to the police that they have evidence before them; the 'plain view' doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one
object to another until something incriminating at last emerges.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971), overruled, Washington
v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1 (1982).
51. "Open view" is essentially that which is readily observable. Since
"what a person knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of
Fourth Amendment protection." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351
(1967).
52. Patterson v. People, 168 Colo. 417, 451 P.2d 445 (1969) (fact that invitee was an undercover police officer did not invalidate his 'plain view'
search); State v. Magnano, 97 Conn. 543, 117 A. 550 (1922) (observations
made while responding to fire alarm were not unreasonable).
53. United States v. Grimes, 426 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1970) (no fourth
amendment violation when police observed suspect property from neighbor's property with the neighbor's consent).
54. Polk v. United States, 314 F.2d 837 (9th Cir.) (observations into
dwelling from a public access walkway were held not violative of the fourth
amendment), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 844 (1963); State v. Dixon, 391 So.2d 836
(La. 1980) (police have the same right to travel and observe from public
walkways as the general public).
55. United States v. Jackson, 588 F.2d 1046 (5th Cir.) (non-electronic
eavesdropping from adjacent room did not violate the fourth amendment),
cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979); United States v. Martin, 509 F.2d 1211 (9th
Cir.) (non-trespassory eavesdropping held reasonable), cert. denied, 421
U.S 967 (1975); Gil v. Beto, 440 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1971) (observation through
motel window of defendant using drugs did not offend fourth amendment);
United States v. Grimes, 426 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1970) (binocular observations
from neighboring property were not offensive to the fourth amendment);
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57
lice were located.

Most of the concepts of the property determinative approach are still, to some extent, applicable.5 8 But the United
States Supreme Court, in Katz v. United States,59 rejected the
Ponce v. Craven, 409 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1969) (observations of defendant
through open door of motel room did not offend fourth amendment). But
see, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (non-trespassory electronic
eavesdropping held unreasonable as an invasion of a reasonable expectation of privacy); United States v. Kim, 415 F. Supp. 1252 (D. Haw. 1976) (telescopic observations into high-rise apartment from a half-mile away was
violative of fourth amendment).
56. This concept was the predecessor to the Katz' reasonable expectation of privacy test. See, e.g., Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942),
overruled, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Goldman held that
absent a physical trespass, no search was unreasonable. Id. at 135. In this
post-Katz era, however, it can no longer be suggested that
in every conceivable instance in which surveillance by the natural
senses is conducted without entering,. . . it may be concluded that no
Fourth Amendment search has occurred. [Contemporary analysis]...
merely says that the lack of trespass is a "highly relevant consideration," not that it is controlling, and certainly there are circumstances in
which it must be concluded that the occupant's justified expectation of
privacy was breached notwithstanding the absence of a trespass.
W. LAFAvE, supra note 5, at § 2.3(c), 303.
57. "[Ilt certainly is not a search for an officer to see or hear what is
occurring inside a dwelling while he is in an area adjacent to that dwelling's
curtilage which is open to the public." W. LAFAvE, supra note 5, at § 2.3(c),
302.
[W]hen police surveillance takes place at a position which cannot be
called a "public vantage point,". . . when the police-though not trespassing upon the defendant's curtilage-resort to [the] extraordinary
step of positioning themselves where neither neighbors nor the general
public would ordinarily be expected to be, the observations or overhearing of what is occurring within a dwelling constitutes a Fourth
Amendment search. This is really what Katz is all about.
Id. at 303-04.
58. Many aspects of fourth amendment analysis have changed since
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), however, many of the cases cited
previously in support of the property determinative interpretation of the
fourth amendment were decided after Katz: Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30
(1970) (sanctity of the dwelling; cited supra note 40); United States v. Jackson, 588 F.2d 1046 (5th Cir.) (eavesdropping from adjacent room; cited supra
note 55), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979); United States v. Martin, 509 F.2d
1211 (9th Cir.) (non-trespassory eavesdropping; cited supra note 55), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 967 (1975); Gil v. Beto, 440 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1971) (observation through window; cited supra note 55); United States v. Capps, 435 F.2d
637 (9th Cir. 1970) (little or no fourth amendment protection beyond the
curtilage; cited supra note 42); see also Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d
385 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (cited supra note 37); United States v. Molkenbur, 430
F.2d 563 (8th Cir.) (cited supra note 44), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 952 (1970);
United States v. Grimes, 426 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1970) (cited supra note 53);
United States v. Hollon, 420 F.2d 302 (5th Cir. 1969) (cited supra note 42);
Ponce v. Craven, 409 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1969) (cited supra note 55); United
States ex rel. Boyance v. Myers, 398 F.2d 896 (3rd Cir. 1968) (cited supra
note 44); Fullbright v. United States, 392 F.2d 432 (10th Cir.) (cited supra
note 41), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 830 (1968).
59. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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application of property law as the sole determinative factor in
fourth amendment cases. In so doing, the Court succeeded in
creating a vague new fourth amendment test: the reasonable
60
expectation of privacy.
The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
In Katz, the Supreme Court discarded the doctrinaire implementation of trespass law as the determinative factor in
fourth amendment analysis. 6 1 The Court replaced the trespassory rule with the vaguely defined reasonable expectation of privacy test. The reasonable expectation of privacy test actually
arose from Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz, 62 in which he
proposed a two-part test. First, that a person must exhibit a subjective expectation of privacy, and second, that the expectation
63
must be one that society recognizes as reasonable.
The theory that a person must subjectively manifest his expectation of privacy has met with disapproval from some commentators and eventually even from Justice Harlan. 64 Courts,
60. Conceptually, the reasonable expectation of privacy is generally attributed to Justice Harlan's concurrence. Id. at 347, 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). The phrase reasonable expectation of privacy, however, was not
actually used by the Supreme Court until Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968);
see infra notes 62 & 63.

61. Katz concerned electronic eavesdropping by the FBI. The defendant was "transmitting wagering information by telephone from Los Angeles
to Miami and Boston." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967). The
defendant, Katz, had used a public telephone booth and the government
argued that the booth was not a constitutionally protected area. The Court
stated that "the Fourth Amendment protects people not places." Id. at 351.
What a person "seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to
the public, may be constitutionally protected." Id. at 351-52 (emphasis added). "Once this much is acknowledged, and once it is recognized that the
Fourth Amendment protects people . . . against unreasonable searches
...,it becomes clear that the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon
the presence or absence of a physical intrusion. . . ." Id. at 353.
62. The reasonable expectation of privacy standard arose from Justice
Harlan's concurring opinion. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring). See supra
note 60.
63. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan analyzed the majority's opinion:
My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is
that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited
an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'. . . Thus a man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he
expects privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to
the 'plain view' of outsiders are not 'protected' because no intention to
keep them to himself has been exhibited.

Id.
64. An actual, subjective expectation of privacy obviously has no
place in a statement of what Katz held or in a theory of what the fourth
amendment protects. It can neither add to, nor can its absence detract
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however, still regularly apply the subjective test in their search
for a systematic approach to fourth amendment analysis 65 and
the logic and reasonableness of that approach may be easily perceived. A reasonable expectation of privacy is intrinsically tied
to the owner's treatment of his property 66 a person who takes
actual steps to close off his property from the public eye, should
reasonably be able to rely on the public to respect his obviously
manifested desire for privacy. Thus it is logically sound to hold
that an individual may reasonably expect a higher level of prifrom, an individual's claim to fourth amendment protection. If it could,
the government could diminish each person's subjective expectation of
privacy merely by announcing ... that we were all ... being placed

under comprehensive electronic surveillance.
Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349,
384 (1974); see also, W. LAFAVE, supra note 5, at § 2.1(c); United States v.
White, 401 U.S. 745, 768 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (challenging the application of the subjective expectation of privacy in fourth amendment analysis).
However, despite the above opposition, the application of the subjective
test is at least superficially reasonable. If an individual exhibits no outward
manifestation of a reasonable expectation of privacy can he actually have
any reasonable expectation of privacy? If an individual does not fence, post,
or otherwise enclose his property, the open fields of Hester are obviously
applicable, however, if that same property owner closes off his property,
courts should not apply the Hester open fields approach.
65. The Katz subjective test is not an absolute that must be obeyed,
rather, it provides a point of reference. The concern is whether the defendant had an actual and reasonable expectation of privacy. The Supreme
Court has recently stated:
Situations can be imagined, of course, in which Katz' two-pronged inquiry would provide an inadequate index of Fourth Amendment protection. For example, if the Government were suddenly to announce on
nationwide television that all homes henceforth would be subject to
warrantless entry, individuals thereafter might not in fact entertain any
actual expectation of privacy regarding their homes, papers, and effects.
Similarly, if a refugee from a totalitarian country, unaware of this Nation's traditions, erroneously assumed that police were continuously
monitoring his telephone conversations, a subjective expectation of privacy regarding the contents of his calls might be lacking as well. In
such circumstances, when an individual's subjective expectations had
been "conditioned by influences alien to well-recognized Fourth
Amendment freedoms, those subjective expectations could play no
meaningful role in ascertaining what the scope of Fourth Amendment
protection was. In determining whether a "legitimate expectation of
privacy" existed in such cases, a normative inquiry would be proper [to
establish whether a subjective expectation should exist].
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740-41 n.5 (1979).
66. This approach may be readily seen in post-Katz open fields cases.
See, e.g., United States v. Freie, 545 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
966 (1976); United States v. Pruitt, 464 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1972); People v. McClaugherty, 193 Colo. 360, 566 P.2d 361 (1977); State v. Byers, 359 So.2d 84
(La. 1978); State v. Chort, 91 N.M. 584, 577 P.2d 892 (1978); but cf., United
States v. Baldwin, 691 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1982); Patler v. Slayton, 503 F.2d 472
(4th Cir. 1974); United States v. Brown, 473 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1973).
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vacy in a fenced yard than in an open yard. 67 This subjective
expectation of privacy, however, is only recognized when it is
physically manifested. 68 Obviously, most criminals have a subjective anticipation of, or desire for, privacy, but that anticipation or desire was not meant to provide a basis for fourth
amendment protection.
The second requirement, that society recognize the expectation of privacy as reasonable, is essentially an objective test.
The test identifies the level of privacy that a reasonable man
would expect. 69 Therefore, regardless of the subjective exhibi67. The distinction between fenced and open land is a Katz distinction.
If the owner has taken precautions to close his land off from the public, he
has exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy. In the United States
there is no police power to routinely search at will. State v. Brady, 406 So.2d

1093 (Fla. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S.Ct. 1706 (1983). "[TIhe open fields doc-

trine cannot be used as carte blanche for a warrantless search simply because the location searched is not part of a dwelling or its ... curtilage."

Id. at 1095. "We are not.., sounding the death knell for the open fields
doctrine-only for ... [its] blind, indiscriminate application.
Id. at
1098.
68. This requirement of physical manifestation can sometimes prove
difficult. For one thing, they are virtually impossible to manifest skyward.
See e.g., United States v. DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. 1078, 1081 (W.D. Mich.
1980) (in an aerial surveillance case: "Merely because defendant neatly
planted contraband in places not observable from the road doesn't mean
that all surveillance of the property thereafter is foreclosed."); United
States v. Mullinex, 508 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Ky. 1980) ("In this case the

defendant could not have a reasonable expectation of privacy from aerial
surveillance regardless of the remoteness of the farm or his efforts to conceal the marijuana from roadside view."); State v. Layne, 623 S.W.2d 629
(Tenn. 1982) ("One who establishes a three-quarter-acre tract of cultivation
surrounded by forests exhibits no reasonable expectation of immunity from

overflight."); but see, Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 536 F. Supp. 1355, 1365
(E.D. Mich. 1982) ("This Court is not prepared to conclude that ... [one]

must build a dome over... [his property] before ... [he] can be said to
have manifested or exhibited an expectation of privacy."); see also, Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 599 (1981) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment protects
the interest of the owner of property in being free from unreasonable intrusions

. . .")

(emphasis in original); Gillette v. State, 588 S.W.2d 361 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1979) (notice in fitting room of store surveillance destroyed any

subjective expectation of privacy).
69. This objective test is often measured as a balance between individual rights and society's legitimate law enforcement interests. See, e.g.,

United States v. Richards, 638 F.2d 765, 770 (5th Cir. 1981) ("Because the
fourth amendment expressly prohibits only unreasonable warrantless
searches, it patently incorporates a balancing test, weighing in one measure
the level of intrusion into individual privacy and in the other the public interest to be served."); United States v. Bobo, 477 F.2d 974, 979 (4th Cir. 1973)
[T] he requirements of the Fourth Amendment are not inflexible or obtusely unyielding to the legitimate needs of law enforcement ....

It is

then, with an eye toward implementing the Fourth Amendment's goal
of securing the sanctity of personal privacy and at the same time accommodating the legitimate ends of law enforcement, that we view the
challenged [activity].
United States v. Dunbar, 470 F. Supp. 704, 707 (D. Conn. 1979) ("legitimate
governmental interests must be considered in determining the reasonable-
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what
tion of an expectation of privacy, the objective standard 7of
0
society recognizes as reasonable must also be satisfied.
Some property distinctions, however, have survived the
Katz decision. Distinctions are still drawn between dwellings,
curtilage, and open fields. 71 The distinctions though, are now
based on the varying reasonable expectations of privacy that attach to property. 72 The Supreme Court, however, has stated
that individuals always possess some expectation of privacy
73
that should be viewed as reasonable.
The fourth amendment's protection, as extended to dwell74
ings, is virtually immaterial to a discussion of aerial searches.
Of more concern is the protection afforded to the curtilage. The
fourth amendment's protection has been held to run strongly
ness of a search"); United States v. Burrow, 396 F. Supp. 890 (D. Md. 1975)
(legitimate governmental interests must be recognized in analyzing the reasonableness of searches on military installations); see also W. LAFAVE,
supra note 5, at § 2.1(d).
70. Regardless of whether a court applies the subjective aspects of the
reasonable expectation of privacy test, the objective considerations still remain. See W. LAFAvE, supra note 5, at § 2.1(d); Amsterdam, supra note 64,
at 381-87; Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (see supra note 65 for relevant quote).
71. 'The maxim of Katz that the fourth amendment protects 'people not
places' is of only limited usefulness, for in considering what people can reasonably expect to maintain as private we must inevitably speak in terms of
places." Patler v. Slayton, 503 F.2d 472, 478 (4th Cir. 1974).
72. See e.g., United States v. Edmunds, 611 F.2d 1386 (5th Cir. 1980) (expectation of privacy in fenced and posted land was unreasonable since the
public routinely used the area in contravention of the posting); Skipper v.
State, 387 So.2d 261 (Ala. Crim. App.) (marijuana was two hundred feet
from the house, outside of the curtilage, and, therefore, outside of the reasonable expectation of privacy), cert. denied, 387 So.2d 268 (Ala. 1980); Gustafson v. State, 267 Ark. 830, 593 S.W.2d 187 (Ct. App. 1980) (stolen radios
were hidden in wooded area behind apartment, therefore, no reasonable expectation of privacy. But see, State v. Byers, 359 So. 2d 84 (La. 1978)
(marijuana field in a fenced and posted area was subject to a reasonable
expectation of privacy, observation was not possible absent considerable
trespassory effort); State v. Chort, 91 N.M. 584, 577 P.2d 892 (Ct. App. 1978)
(fenced garden within a fenced ten acre tract evidenced a reasonable expectation of privacy).
73. "[WIhat he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible
to the public, may be constitutionally protected." Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 351-2 (1967).
74. But see "In the far distance a helicopter skimmed down between the
roofs, hovered for an instant like a blue-bottle, and then darted away again
with a curving flight. It was the Police Patrol, snooping into people's windows." G. ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FouR 6 (1949). But see State v. Rogers, - N.M. -, 673 P.2d 142 (Ct. App. 1983) (aerial surveillance onto and into
greenhouse held valid). "While the facts of this case teeter dangerously
close to exceeding the limitations implicit in the Fourth Amendment, we do
not believe that the defendant may claim constitutional protection under
these circumstances: We hold that defendant had no justifiable expectation
of privacy with respect to marijuana plants protruding through holes in his
greenhouse roof.

. .

." Id. at -,

673 P.2d at 144.
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throughout the curtilage, in fact, the curtilage is often consid75
ered to be a virtual extension of the dwelling.
Outside of the curtilage, however, the "open fields" exception is generally applied. 76 This exception, as applied in Hester,
granted almost unlimited authority to search open fields. 77 Unfortunately, the open fields of Hester are often considered to include almost everything outside the curtilage. 78 The Supreme
Court still recognizes the Hester open fields exception, although,
courts must now temper their Hester interpretation with a Katz
analysis.7 9 If a person fences and posts his property, it should
no longer automatically be considered open fields. Unfortunately, many courts still apply the open fields exception to virtually all property outside of the curtilage. 80
As stated previously, the observation of objects exposed to
"open view" is not considered to be a search. 81 This exception to
75. State v. Vicars, 207 Neb. 325, 299 N.W.2d 421 (1980) (protection of
"house" extends to curtilage and domestic buildings, there is a reasonable
expectation of privacy in those areas); United States v. Van Dyke, 643 F.2d
992 (4th Cir. 1981) (reversing a trial court's admission of evidence: honeysuckle patch, even though 150' from the house, was still within the fenced
curtilage and subject to the same expectation of privacy).
76. See, e.g., Ford v. State, 264 Ark. 141, 569 S.W.2d 105 (entry onto
fenced and posted property by breaking a locked gate, was not violative of
the fourth amendment), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 957 (1979); see also supra note
37.
77. See Conrad v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 616, 218 N.W.2d 252 (1974) (police
digging in defendant's open field discovered defendant's missing wife; held
not violative of the fourth amendment. Open fields are "beyond the ambit
of the Fourth Amendment's protection." Id. at 628, 218 N.W.2d 258); see also
Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22 (10th Cir. 1956) (open fields applies to
"still" found in cave), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 932 (1956); Bedell v. State, 257
Ark. 895, 521 S.W.2d 200 (1975) (police have virtually free hand in searching
open fields), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1977).
78. Hester concerned police observation of activity in an open field and
the subsequent warrantless search of that field. It has since been extended
to virtually all areas outside of the curtilage and has often been used to
"determine" where the curtilage ends; see, e.g., McDowell v. United States,
383 F.2d 599 (8th Cir. 1967) (trespassory observation of game violations acceptable, regardless of no trespassing signs); Janney v. United States, 206
F.2d 601 (4th Cir. 1953) (fencing of property immaterial to "open fields" exception); Nathanson v. State, 554 P.2d 456 (Alaska 1976) (applied to open
waters); State v. Caldwell, 20 Ariz. App. 331, 512 P.2d 863 (1973) (applied
where ever the public is likely to wander); Cornman v. State, 156 Ind. App.
112, 294 N.E.2d 812 (1973) (applied to quarry within wooded area); State v.
Aragon, 89 N.M. 91, 547 P.2d 574 (Ct. App. 1976) (applied to can of heroin
"hidden" in vacant urban lot), cert. denied, 89 N.M. 206, 549 P.2d 284 (1976).
79. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967); see also Air Pollution
Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861, 865 (1974); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973).
80. See supra notes 40-44.
81. As a general proposition, it is fair to say that when a law enforcement officer is able to detect something by utilization of one or more of
his senses while lawfully present at the vantage point where those
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the fourth amendment's warrant requirement poses an interesting dilemma when applied to the airborn observer. Observations within this exception are necessarily open; that is, they are
of areas and objects apparently open to aerial observation.
However, when an aircraft is used as an aid, to allow the police
to see what they could not otherwise see, it would appear illogi82
cal to hold the property observed to have been openly viewed.
The concern thereby becomes, whether any person or object out
of doors can be other than in open view. This universal susceptability of property to aerial open view should not be valid
under a Katz expectation of privacy analysis. 83 The fourth
amendment should not require canopies or domes as the only
effective subjective manifestation of privacy. Moreover, society
should recognize some reasonable expectation of privacy
outside of the house.
AIRBORN SEARCHES AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

The use of aircraft by police as a search tool is a relatively
senses are used, that detection does not constitute a "search" within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
W. LAFAVE, supra note 5, at § 2.2. But see 2 W. RINGEL, SEARCHES &
SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS,

I, § 8.2 (1982).

Not every observation made by a government agent amounts to a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The police may
take note of anything that is evident to any of their senses, as long as
they are in a place where they have a right to be, and so long as they do
not resort to extraordinary means to make the observation.
Id. "Courts have long noted that no search is involved when an officer fortuitously views evidence from a place in which he has a lawful right to be."
MODEL RULES, WARRANTLESS SEARCHES OF PERSONS AND PLACES, commen-

tary to rule 101 (Project on Law Enforcement Policy & Rulemaking 1974).
"An officer lawfully in any place may, without obtaining a warrant, seize
any item in plain view, if he has probable cause to believe that the item is
contraband,. .

."

Id. at rule 101.

82. "Observations of evidence in 'open' view fall outside of the scope of
the Fourth Amendment, but clearly the evidence cannot really be in 'open'
view if the police have to resort to extraordinary means to obtain the view."
W. RINGEL, supra note 81, at § 8.2(c). But see "Use by government agents of
devices meant to enhance their normal sense perception does not change
the extent of the intrusion sufficiently to make otherwise innocent conduct
a search." Id. at § 8.2(b).
83. During the era of trespassory interpretation of the fourth amendment, the concern was not with how the police observed, but rather, from
where the police observed. The Katz decision struck at that concept, holding that it was not where the police were, but what they were doing that
mattered under the fourth amendment. The device used in Katz was a nonintrusive electronic eavesdropping device-there was no physical trespass.
So the use of sensory enhancement devices is not immune to the fourth
amendment and reasonable expectations of privacy. See United States v.
Kim, 415 F. Supp. 1252 (D. Hawaii 1976) (telescopic observations into apartment violated tenants reasonable expectation of privacy); accord, United
States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131 (2nd Cir. 1980).
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recent development.8 4 This use presents unique problems in
determining what expectations of privacy are reasonable; including whether a person outdoors can have any legitimate expectation of privacy from airborn intrusions. Consistent with
the gradual technological erosion of fourth amendment rights,
the traditional protection accorded the curtilage has been limited by the advent of aerial surveillance. Establishing the relationship between aerial surveillance and the reasonable search
will turn upon applying two basic fourth amendment concepts
to aerial police activity: first, when does aerial surveillance
amount to a search; 85 and second, when should that search be
86
held unreasonable.
When is Aerial Surveillance a Search
The courts have often stated that there can be few bright
lines or well defined rules in fourth amendment interpretation;
each individual fact situation demands individual considera84. The first reported aerial search case was People v. Sneed, 32 Cal.
App. 3d 535, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1973). But see G. ORWELL, supra note 74, at 5.
Twenty-five aerial search cases were discovered and examined by this author. United States v. Dunn, 674 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Allen, 633 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 833 (1981); Dow
Chem. Co. v. United States, 536 F. Supp. 1355 (E.D. Mich. 1982); United
States v. Mullinex, 508 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Ky. 1980); United States v.
DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. 1078 (W.D. Mich. 1980); People v. Egan, 141 Cal. App.
3d 798, 190 Cal. Rptr. 546 (1983); People v. Joubert, 140 Cal. App. 3d 946, 190
Cal. Rptr. 23 (1983); Tuttle v. Superior Ct. of San Luis Obispo Cty., 120 Cal.
App. 3d 320, 174 Cal. Rptr. 576, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1033 (1981); People v.
Jourbert, 118 Cal. App. 3d 637, 173 Cal. Rptr. 428 (1981); People v. St. Amour,
104 Cal. App. 3d 886, 163 Cal. Rptr. 187 (1980); Burkholder v. Superior Ct. for
Cty. of Santa Cruz, 96 Cal. App. 3d 421, 158 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1979); People v.
Superior Ct. for Cty. of Los Angeles, 37 Cal. App. 3d 836, 112 Cal. Rptr. 764
(1974); Dean v. Superior Ct. for Cty. of Nevada, 35 Cal. App. 3d 112, 110 Cal.
Rptr. 585 (1973); People v. Sneed, 32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146
(1973); State v. Brighter, 60 Hawaii 318, 589 P.2d 527 (1979); State v. Stachler,
58 Hawaii 412, 570 P.2d 1323 (1977); People v. Lashmett, 71 Ill. App. 3d 429,
389 N.E.2d 888 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1081 (1980); State v. Groff, 323
N.W.2d 204 (Iowa 1982); State v. Cemper, 209 Neb. 376, 307 N.W.2d 820 (1981);
State v. Bigler, - N.M. -, 673 P.2d 140 (Ct. App. 1983); State v. Rogers, N.M. -, 673 P.2d 142 (Ct. App. 1983); State v. Davis, 51 Or. App. 827, 627 P.2d
492 (1981); State v. Roode, 643 S.W.2d 651 (Tenn. 1982); State v. Layne, 623
S.W.2d 629 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981); Goehring v. State, 627 S.W.2d 159 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1982). These cases break down chronologically to: two in 1973;
one in 1974; none in 1975 or 1976; one in 1977; none in 1978; three in 1979; four
in 1980; five in 1981; five in 1982; and four in 1983.
85. See infra notes 87-137 and the text accompanying.
86. See infra notes 138-175 and the text accompanying. See also United
States v. Ragsdale, 470 F.2d 24, 27 (5th Cir. 1972) (only unreasonable
searches are barred by the fourth amendment); United States v. Love, 413 F.
Supp. 1122, 1124 (S.D. Tex.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1025 (1976). "[Nlot all
searches ...

are denounced, only those that are unreasonable." Id.
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tion.8 7 In analyzing aerial surveillance, there are numerous considerations in determining whether police activity constitutes a
search within the context of the fourth amendment: whether
the use of aircraft is intrinsically a manifestation of a search;
whether the observations were inadvertant or systematic;
whether the activity was directed as specific people or property;
or, whether the observations were general in nature.
Initially, however, a general definition of what constitutes a
search is necessary. Searches have been defined as "examinations by authority of law, of one's premises or person, with a
view to the discovery of stolen, contraband, or illicit property, or
some evidence of guilt, to be used in the prosecution of a criminal action."88 This definition, while lacking the refinements of
the most exacting court rulings, provides a good basis for initiating this discussion. 89
Police use of aircraft for surveillance activities should not be
viewed as inherently rising to the level of a search. There are
numerous non-search activities that the government may legitimately perform with aircraft. Clearly, the aerial observation of
waterways and roadways lies outside of the fourth amendment's
prohibition. 90 Therefore, the mere use of aircraft should not
lead to a presumption that a police search has occurred. But if
the use of aircraft by police does not automatically constitute a
search, should it make any difference whether the "search" was
merely the result of inadvertant observation rather than the
product of systematic surveillance. 91 There is a natural reluc87. United States v. Nevarez-Alcantar, 495 F.2d 678 (10th Cir.) (fourth
amendment rulings must be based on the individual facts of each case),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 878 (1974).
88. AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 15, at 956.
89. See 79 C.J.S., Searches and Seizures, § 1 (1952). A search is "some
exploratory investigation, or an invasion and quest, a looking for or seeking
out." Id., quoted in, W. LAFAVE, supra note 5, at § 2.2. "A search implies a
prying into hidden places for that which is concealed and that the object
searched for has been hidden or intentionally put out of the way." Id.
"[A] search is made when federal agents enter a protected area to inspect it visually whether or not they ransack or engage in other conduct
usually suggested by the word 'search.'" United States v. Ryles, 291 F.
supp. 492, 494 (D. Del. 1968), affd, 415 F.2d 190, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 926
(1971).
The Supreme Court has not defined "search" due to a reluctance to be
constrained later by any Court made definition.
90. There is no contention here that the aerial observation of vehicles
on public ways or at sea presents any fourth amendment problems. Likewise, legitimate searches for the fugitive and the lost are of no concern in
this discussion.
91. Inadvertance has long been tied to the fourth amendment. It probably arose out of a desire not to penalize the police for any fortunate discovery which might arise. See generally, Case-Comment, Criminal
Procedure-"Inadvertance":The Increasingly Vestigial Prong of the Plain
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tance to view the inadvertant discovery of criminal behavior as a
search. Presumptively, if the police were where they had a right
to be, where everyone had a right to be, the mere happenstance
of their good fortune in observing criminal behavior in "open
view" should not be deemed unreasonable. 92 It is both logical
and appealing to find no fourth amendment search when the police, during a routine, non-investigatory flight, happen to dis93
cover a field of marijuana.
In State v. Roode,94 Tennessee State Police, while on a routine helicopter survey of traffic patterns, observed marijuana
growing on the defendant's farm.95 There is an obvious correlation between inadvertant aerial observations and inadvertant
observations by land-bound police. The inadvertance or happenstance of the observation and its lack of intent precluded its
categorization as a search. However, the obverse is not always
as clear. If the police go aloft intentionally seeking evidence,
contraband, or crimes, they appear to be, per se, engaging in a
search. In determining whether systematic police activity rises
to the level of a search, there are three basic categories within
which the suspect police activity may fall: the police may have
been looking at specific suspect property;96 the police may have
View Doctrine, 10 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 399 (1980). See also Thompson v.
United States, 382 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1967) (police in room as invitees "discovered" drugs when they fell from behind painting-no search); United
States v. Ball, 381 F.2d 702 (6th Cir.) (jacket which tied defendant to bank

robbery had been inadvertantly thrown over his shoulders during arrest for
drunkeness), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 962 (1967).
92. See supra notes 45-51, 91 and accompanying text.
93. State v. Roode, 643 S.W.2d 651 (Tenn. 1982) (discovery of marijuana

field during routine aerial photography for the highway department did not
constitute search within the meaning of the fourth amendment), compare
with, Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 536 F. Supp. 1355 (E.D. Mich. 1982)
(systematic photography of property from aircraft did constitute search).
94. 643 S.W.2d 651 (Tenn. 1982).

95. Id. at 652.
[Oin October 10, 1979, Lt. Mike Dover of the Tennessee Highway Patrol

was directed to fly a. . . helicopter from Nashville to Chattanooga and
to assist the Tennessee Department of Transportation in taking aerial

photographs needed for a state road project. Lt. Dover flew the south-

ern "Federal Designated Airway"...... On the return trip, Officer Dover's attention was focused to the ground by sunlight reflecting from
fertilizer bags. As he passed over the site where the bags were located,
he saw several acres of growing marijuana plants . . . and two men
working in the field.
Id.
96. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 536 F. Supp. 1355 (E.D. Mich. 1982)

(EPA overflights constituted a search); United States v. Mullinex, 508 F.

Supp. 512 (E.D. Ky. 1980) (flights directed specifically at defendant were
search); United States v. DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. 1078 (W.D. Mich. 1980)

(overflights directed a defendant's property out in the "boonies" constituted a search).
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been looking for a specific illegal activity;97 or perhaps, the po98
lice might have just been looking.
Regardless of any resultant land-bound searches or arrests,
the first type of aerial surveillance is the most intrusive. When
the police have gone to search a person's property from the air
without a warrant, they are likely acting with less than probable
cause, perhaps motivated by a "tip" or some other insufficient
basis for information. 9 9 The police activity, however, is intrinsically "search" like and most courts would recognize the activity

as arising to a search. 10 0 In People v. Joubert,10 a California ap-

pellate court recognized that aerial surveillance directed specifically at the defendant's property constituted a search. 10 2 The
Joubert search was initiated in response to rumors of marijuana
cultivation on the defendant's property 0 3 and subsequently the
probable cause necessary for the issuance of a warrant for a terrestrial search was predicated upon the results of the aerial
97. State v. Stachler, 58 Hawaii 412, 570 P.2d 1323 (1977) (routine
App. 3d
marijuana flights constituted searches); People v. Lashmett, 71 Ill.
429, 389 N.E.2d 888 (1979) (county wide aerial search for stolen farm equipment), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1081 (1980).
98. See State v. Layne, 623 S.W.2d 629 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981) (helicopter patrol seeking stripped cars, stills, marijuana, or other criminal activity
did not constitute a search).
99. In most reported aerial surveillance cases the police were acting on
a tip or some other basis of suspicion. Generally they went on then to
search a specific area.
100. See e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 536 F. Supp. 1355 (E.D.
Mich. 1982) (actually the Dow Chemical court did not have to find a
"search," the government admitted that they had searched, the EPA was
merely contesting whether it was an unreasonable search); United States v.
Mullinex, 508 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Ky. 1980) (court's discussion was essentially limited to the reasonableness, or unreasonableness, of the search);
People v. Joubert, 118 Cal. App. 3d 637, 173 Cal. Rptr. 428 (1981) (court first
found search, but then ruled that it had been reasonable).
101. 118 Cal. App. 3d 637, 173 Cal. Rptr. 428 (1981).
102. "Madera County Deputy Sheriff Albert Hahn, having heard rumors
that marijuana was being cultivated on a particular rural parcel of land
.... decided to conduct an aerial surveillance to confirm the rumors." Id.
at 640, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 430. The appellate court, in analyzing the surveillance, stated that "[glood arguments can be made that a citizen should be
able to possess a few acres of mountainious land in a rural area and be
protected from governmental intrusion into his activities thereon, short of
the necessity to preserve human life or property. Ample authority exists
for the proposition that ... the possessor of rural lands ... need not anticipate the presence of police officers engaged in exploratory searches." Id. at
647-48, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 434 (emphasis added). Regardless of these statements, the court went on to hold that "whether a citizen should be deemed
to have an objective right of privacy from optically aided aerial surveillance
• ..on isolated rural mountain land is a question of public policy. . . and
that public policy must allow for these searches." Id. at 648, 173 Cal. Rptr. at
435.
103. Id. at 640, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 430.
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search. 10 4 Although the aerial surveillance in Joubert was recognized as a search, it was found to have been reasonable and thus
not invalid. 10 5
Similarly, in Dow Chemical Co. v. United
States,10 6 the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) sponsored overflights and photography of a Dow Chemical plant in
an attempt to discover pollution violations. 0 7 A federal district
court held that the EPA's surveillance activities constituted a
search. 10 8 Unlike the search in Joubert, the overflights in Dow
Chemical were recognized as unreasonable. 10 9
A more difficult situation arises when the police were looking, not at specific property, but rather, searching for a specific
offense. Thus, in People v. Lashmett," 0 an Illinois sheriff
chartered an airplane in order to conduct a county-wide search
for stolen farm equipment."' Upon sighting suspect equipment
on the defendant's farm, a more traditional foot-borne search
was conducted." 2 An Illinois appellate court did not question
104. Id. "Probable cause for the warrant was based on an aerial surveillance of respondent's land by ... officers using binoculars to identify a marijuana garden." Id. The trial court suppressed the seized evidence, not
holding that the aerial surveillance had been unreasonable, but that the use
of binoculars had been unreasonable; the appellate court reversed, holding
that the search, in toto, had been reasonable. Id. at 640, 651, 173 Cal. Rptr. at
430, 436.
105. Id. at 651, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 436.
106. 536 F. Supp. 1355 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
107. Id. at 1357. See also infra notes 157-63 and accompanying text.
108. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 536 F. Supp. at 1358-59. Actually the
court noted "that the EPA ha[d] admitted, both in its briefs and at oral
argument, that the flyover constituted both a 'quest for evidence' and a
'search' of Dow's plant. EPA ha[d] also admitted that the search was conducted without first securing a warrant. With these two premises established, the Court, need(ed] only [to] determine whether the search was
unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Id. (citations
omitted) (emphasis in the original).
109. Id. at 1375. The court found that "the EPA flyover and aerial photography of Dow's plant constituted an unreasonablesearch in violation of the
Fourth Amendment." Id. (emphasis added).
110. 71 MI1.App. 3d 429, 389 N.E.2d 888 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1081
(1980).
111. [TIhe sheriff "chartered a airplane and flew over the entire territory of Scott County, in search of... the ...

missing farm machinery."

During this flight on the premises of Lashmett Industries he spotted
"what appeared to be [the stolen equipment]. He also observed a
green tractor ... in an open feedlot on the farm of Dan Lashmett. Also
on the Lashmett farm, in places not visible from the public road, he
observed a . . . cornhead, a large model John Deere combine, a red
wheel disc and a semi mounted plow.
Id. at 430-31, 389 N.E.2d at 889. All of the described equipment matched the
description of the stolen equipment.
112. Id. at 431, 389 N.E.2d at 889. "After the ... aerial investigation, the
sheriff personally went on Lashmett's property and observed the identification plate on the John Deere ... farm tractor which bore the same vehicle
identification number as the identification plate missing from Pike County."
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that the sheriffs aerial surveillance constituted a search, 113 but
the court refused to characterize the aerial surveillance as an
unreasonable search primarily due to its unobtrusive character. 114 More commonly, however, aerial surveillance is con115
cerned with marijuana searches. Hence, in State v. Davis,116
and Burkholder v. Superior Courtfor County of Santa Cruz,
general area-wide aerial surveillances were recognized as
searches, but were upheld as reasonable. 1 7 As in Lashmett,
these decisions were based on the unobtrusive nature of aerial
surveillance." 8
These situations demonstrate that technology has given
contemporary police the ability to do what the fourth amendment was originally adopted to prevent. 119 The authority to
search "any house, shop, cellar, warehouse, or other place...
for prohibited and uncustomed" items was the "unreasonable"
grant of authority contained in the writs of assistance. 120 The
current social concern over the drug problem should not be alId. Additionally, there were statements from several informants, which,
when coupled with the aerial surveillance and the sheriffs land born incursion, established the probable cause necessary for the issuance of a warrant. Id. at 430, 389 N.E.2d at 889.
113. The court did not deal with whether a search had occurred, but
rather, dealt directly with the reasonableness of that search. See infra note
114.
114. The court drew, for analogy, upon the California case of People v.
Sneed, 32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1973). The Lashmett court
stated that in Sneed, the California "court noted that the helicopter activity
was 'manifestly exploratory' in nature and that its position 20-25 feet above
the ground was an 'obtrusive invasion of privacy' and probably illegal. In
dictum, though, the [Sneed] court stated that [the] defendant would certainly have no reasonable expectation of privacy 'from airplanes and
helicopters flying at legal and reasonable heights.' Here. . . [in Lashmett I
the sheriff testified . . . that the airplane was flying 2400 feet above the
ground." People v. Lashmett, 71 Ill. App. 3d at 431-32, 389 N.E.2d at 889-90,
quoting and citing, People v. Sneed, 32 Cal. App. 3d at 542-43, 108 Cal. Rptr.
at 151.
115. 51 Or. App. 827, 627 P.2d 492 (1981).

116. 96 Cal. App. 3d 421, 158 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1979).
117. In Davis, the police were engaged in aerial surveillance of the southern half of Josephine County, Oregon. State v. Davis, 51 Or. App. at 828, 627
P.2d at 493. In Burkholder, the airborn search involved the overflight of a
rural California county; the police were looking for marijuana. Burkholder
v. Superior Ct. for County of Santa Cruz, 96 Cal. App. 3d at 423-24, 158 Cal.
Rptr. at 87.
118. "We conclude that. . the ... observations, achieved during unobtrusive overflights, violated no privacy rights.. . ..." Burkholder v. Superior
Ct. for County of Santa Cruz, 96 Cal. App. 3d at 426, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 89
(emphasis added). The Davis court dealt primarily with reversing the trial
court that had reasoned that the search was unreasonable based on altitude
regulations. State v. Davis, 51 Or. App. at 828, 627 P.2d at 493. See also infra
note 169 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 12-33 and the text accompanying.
120. 13 & 14 CAR. I, ch. 11th (1673-4); see supra note 26.
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lowed to justify the emergence of a conceptual writ of assistance
in response to current social exigencies. This activity, unlike
the legitimate terrestrial patrol, rises to the level of a general
search contrary to the prohibition of general searches underlying the adoption of the fourth amendment. 12 1 Technological advances in police capabilities should not be allowed to
circumvent the fourth amendment's proscription of general
searches merely because those searches can now be performed
unobtrusively. A balancing of private rights with public needs
may be utilized, but the fourth amendment is concerned with
the protection of the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy; the balance of these interests, individual versus societal,
must be weighted accordingly. 122 American society should continue to recognize the individual's legitimate interest in not being observed; to be let alone. General searches are as
reprehensible as specific searches: it should not be viewed as
less offensive to spy on society generally than to spy on society
individually.
The situation where the police are routinely in the sky,
watching for illegality in general is analogous to land-bound police patrols.1 23 This activity lies between the inadvertant, but
fortuitous police observer and the oppresiveness of the general
searcher. As such, individual factual situations must be analyzed to determine whether the observer's actions were closer to
the inadvertant observer or to the general searcher.
In State v. Stachler,124 a routine police helicopter patrol
sighted marijuana growing on the defendant's property. 125 Because the Hawaii Supreme Court found that the helicopter surveillance was not a search, it did not address its
121. See supra notes 12-33 and the accompanying text.

122. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969) (individual rights outweigh

public needs); United States v. Davis, 423 F.2d 974 (5th Cir.) (government
always has an interest, the fourth amendment serves to restrain govern-

ment actions in pursuit of those interests), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 836 (1970).
123. State v. Layne, 623 S.W.2d 629 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981) (helicopter
used to watch for criminal activity).
124. 58 Hawaii 412, 570 P.2d 1323 (1977).
125. [P]olice were conducting a general surveillance via helicopter of
the Captain Cook, Kona, area looking for criminal activity. In this

sparsely populated and relatively remote aea of the island of Hawaii,
[the] defendant ... leased about four acres of land on which his residence was located. Defendant's property was adjacent to a forest reserve just below a high ridge and was surrounded by abandoned coffee
farms, wild guava growth and numerous macadamia nut, mango and

avocado trees. His land could not be seen from the nearest public road,
nor from neighboring property, and to get to the house one had to pass
up an unimproved road.
Id. at 414, 570 P.2d at 1325.
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reasonableness. 126 Among the factors considered by the court
was the existence of routine police helicopter flights near the
defendant's property and throughout Hawaii generally. 127 Following this reasoning, any activity which the police perform routinely can potentially evolve into a "reasonable" activity. 128 The
fallacy of this reasoning should be obvious. Allowing police activity to continue routinely does not constitute a waiver of fourth
amendment rights; in fact, a challenge to the activity, as in
Stachler, belies the existence of any waiver.
In State v. Layne, 129 the Tennessee State Police "were
searching for stripped cars, moonshine stills, patches of marijuana and law violations generally."' 30 Their aerial surveillance
was essentially similar to terrestrial police patrols, except that
their ability to observe was greatly enhanced by being airborn.
Although, this situation presents the classic example of routine
aerial patrols, it is difficult to assess whether the police activity
was inherently unreasonable. The fact that the police were
aided by aircraft in their observational efforts need not necessarily be viewed as negative or positive.
Another major consideration in determining whether aerial
activity rises to the level of a search is whether aircraft should
be considered sensory enhancements. Sensory enhancements
generally include any device or artifice which allows police to
sensorily perceive that which they would not otherwise be able
to perceive; such devices include binoculars, telescopes, parabolic microphones, and trained animals. Originally the fourth
amendment analysis of enhancements was tied to trespass law:
126. Id. at 420, 570 P.2d at 1329. The court was affirming the trial court's
result but by different reasoning. The trial court had found that a search
had occurred, but had held that the search had been reasonable. Id. at 414,
570 P.2d at 1325. The appellate court merely found that no search had occurred; primarily due to an "open view" theory. Id. at 415-420, 570 P.2d at
1326-29.

127.

[If it had been shown that helicopter flights were rare occur-

rences in the area, the objective reasonableness of defendant's expecta-

tion of privacy would be more credible. However, the lower court found
that although this was a sparsely populated area there were occasional
helicopter flights over the area by the National Guard and "crop dusters" and there was testimony that light aircraft, including tour, pleasure
and business craft, flew over the area each day.
Id. at 418, 570 P.2d at 1328.
128. For the Supreme Court's view of this waiver theory, see Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). A relevant passage is quoted supra note 65.
See also supra note 64.
129. 623 S.W.2d 629 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981).
130. Id. at 631 (emphasis added). Although, in fact, the police had completed their work for the day. One of the officers suspected that marijuana
was being grown on the Layne farm, so the officers flew over the farm on
their way home. Id.
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under this analysis, if the police had the right to be where they
were, any observations made by their having used enhancements was valid. 13 1 With the advent of the Katz era, however,
the interest shifted from trespass law to intrusions into the individual's reasonable expectations of privacy. One post-Katz test
suggested that police activity should be valid under the fourth
amendment only when the police have used the enhancement
device merely to see more clearly that which was already observable; 132 or, when the police merely used the device to see
from a distance that which could have been observed more
33
closely except for the surreptitious motivations of the police.
Failing to fit one of these two patterns, the enhancement should
be recognized as violative of the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy. Under this test, aircraft are offensive to the
fourth amendment as unreasonable enhancements because aircraft are used in order to permit the police to observe objects
otherwise not viewable in the absence of a physical invasion of
34
the property.
As discussed previously, some uses of aircraft by the police,
including searches for specific criminal behavior 135 and observations of specific suspect property, 136 should be viewed as
searches. However, it is also possible for police aerial surveillance not to amount to a search; inadvertant observations by the
fortunate airborn police officer should not be classified as
searches. 137 Beyond a determination that specific police activity
crosses the fourth amendment's threshold, there must follow a
determination of whether that activity was reasonable.
The Reasonableness of Aerial Surveillance
Similar to the determination of when a search has occurred,
establishing the reasonableness of a search depends upon the
131. See e.g., Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S 129 (1942) (trespass is
the determinative factor in eavesdropping and observation cases; Goldman

was overruled in Katz).
132. W. LAFAVE, supra note 5, at 2.3.
133. Id.
134. See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 633 F.2d 1281 (9th Cir. 1980) (use of
electronic and visual devices from helicopter at night), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
833 (1981); People v. St. Amour, 104 Cal. App. 3d 886, 163 Cal. Rptr. 187 (1980)
(use of gyro-stabilized binoculars-affording view not otherwise available);
People v. Superior Ct. for County of Los Angeles, 37 Cal. App. 3d 836, 112

Cal. Rptr. 764 (1974) (binocular view was the equivalent of viewing from an
altitude of 70').
135. See supra notes 110-18.
136. See supra notes 99-109.
137. See supra notes 92-95.
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individual factual situation. 138 A general determination of the
reasonableness of a search,. however, may be made by analyzing
two factors: first, what was searched; then, how was it
searched. 139 In establishing the reasonableness of what was
searched, some guidance may be derived from Justice Harlan's
Katz concurrence: "there is a twofold requirement, first that a
person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "140
As noted previously, the subjective expectation of privacy
must be carefully applied since the exhibition of an actual expectation of privacy skyward is virtually impossible.' 4 ' Regardless of how high an individual's walls are, there is no
manifestation of a subjective expectation of privacy skyward absent the complete enclosure of the property. This approach to
fourth amendment analysis appears unreasonable and a more
logical approach would examine a person's earthbound exhibitions of an expectation of privacy. An individual's quest for privacy is most easily recognized by examining the terrestrial
42
activity that the individual has directed towards that goal.1
Any attempt at determining what expectation of privacy society will recognize as reasonable is also difficult. Generally, the
facts of specific situations should not be allowed to confuse the
test's application. The test is primarily objective, although some
specific individual factors should be considered in determining
what society deems to be reasonable. Unfortunately, many
courts become needlessly entangled in complex fact situations
138. "[Tjhe recurring question of reasonableness of searches depend

upon the facts and situations... of the case." Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752, 765 (1969), quoting, United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950).

"[T] he reasonableness of a search is ...a substantive determination to be
made ...from the facts and circumstances of the case." Ker v. California,
374 U.S. 23, 33 (963).

139. This approach necessarily incorporates the reasonable expectation

of privacy test. An objective reasonableness is naturally applied in relation
to what is being searched-person or property; then it is a matter of how it
is being searched. This is not a mechanical doctrine but, rather, it allows an
objective reasonableness standard be applied to specific fact patterns.
140. 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
141. See supra notes 158-59 and the accompanying text.
142. United States v. DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. 1078 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (regardless of defendant's fencing and posting of his property, he had no reasonable expectation of privacy towards overflights); Dean v. Superior Ct. for
County of Nevada, 35 Cal. App. 3d 112, 110 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1973) (remoteness

and inaccessability immaterial). But see Dow Chem. Co. v. United States,
536 F. Supp. 1355 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (extensive security measures were considered in determining whether there was a subjective expectation).
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143
while societal standards should remain primarily objective.
Some subjective analysis becomes necessary, however, when an
individual takes specific subjective steps physically manifesting
In those situations, the courts
his expectation of privacy. 1'
the individual's reasonable exwhat
establish
merely
not
should
pectation of privacy was in a field, but rather, what the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy was in a fenced and
posted field. If an individual's efforts and expectations appear
reasonable, they should be recognized by society as reasonable.
The reasonable expectation of privacy test as applied to
airborn searches is usually limited to two physical areas: the
curtilage and the outlying property. 145 The dwelling, as stated
previously, is, at least at this point in time, secure from aerial
surveillance. 146 Judicial interpretation of an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy should distinguish between the curtilage and the surrounding property, but, in aerial search cases,
the two are often treated similarly. 147 This appears to be due, in
part, to each areas' similar susceptability to aerial surveillance.
Searches of open fields have been recognized as reasonable
since Hester v. United States.148 Open fields were excepted from
fourth amendment protection under the property determinative
analysis, and the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy has not
generally been held to extend to them.1 49 Aircraft have been allowed to search open fields with impunity, regardless of any ac150
tions taken by the property owner to secure his property.

143. See, e.g., Burkholder v. Superior Ct. for County of Santa Cruz, 96

Cal. App. 3d 421, 158 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1979). "[A] possessor of land devoted to
the cultivation of contraband can exhibit no reasonableexpectation of privacy from overflight consistent with the common habits of persons engaged
in agrarian pursuits." Id. at 425, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 88 (emphasis added).
144. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 536 F. Supp. 1355 (E.D. Mich.
1982) (Dow had taken numerous steps to block out prying eyes; the court
took those steps into consideration in ruling that the government search
was unreasonable).
145. See supra note 75.
146. But see supra note 74 for an example of airborn viewing "into" a
structure, a greenhouse, in State v. Rogers, 1983).

N.M. -, 673 P.2d 142 (Ct. App.

147. The curtilage concept is rarely used, apparently the general impres-

sion is that everything is an open field from the sky. But see United States
v. Mullinex, 508 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Ky. 1980). In Mullinex, the court did
suppress one marijuana plant because it had been growing in the curtilage.

Id. at 515.
148. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).

149. Actually a reasonable expectation of privacy can extend to open
fields, but that is rarely done.
150. Most airborn searches have involved "open fields" searches; of the
twenty-five reported aerial search cases (listed supra note 84), only two

have found airborn searches unreasonable. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United

States, 536 F. supp. 1355 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (EPA photographic survey held
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Allowing open fields to be subjected to repeated searches may
be justified by society's unwillingness to recognize a reasonable
expectation of privacy toward activities or objects in open fields.
More troublesome, though, is the situation when the open fields
were, in fact, "closed"; situations where the property owner legitimately attempted to express his desire for privacy but has
failed due to the pervasive surveillance capabilities of aircraft.
In those situations, the property owner has attempted to close
off his land from public access, he has seemingly manifested a
subjective expectation of privacy.
To support the holding that the airborn search of such protected property was still reasonable, courts have followed one of
two different approaches. Some courts have reasoned that the
land-owner's efforts were intended only as a bar to landborn
searchers and did not manifest a skyward expectation of privacy. 5 1 This approach, however, leads to the conclusion that no
activity or object outside can be private. As technology advances, this rationale would lead to a radical curtailment of
fourth amendment protection outdoors. Alternatively, other
courts have held that the property owner's expectation of pri5 2
vacy was not one that society should recognize as reasonable.
These courts have failed to objectively consider the individual's
reasonable expectation of privacy. Such a standard would not
consider what expectation of privacy was reasonable within
fenced and posted land, but rather, what expectation of privacy
would be reasonable within a fenced and posted field of marijuana. Following this approach, courts have reasoned that society need not recognize that expectation as reasonable. 5 3 A few
courts, however, have found reasonable expectations of privacy
unreasonable); People v. Sneed, 32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1973)
(police helicopter search held unreasonable).
151. "While the constitutional privilege of protecting one's privacy covers
not only the ground, but may extend also into the airspace, it is absolutely
essential that the person affected exhibit a reasonable expectation (as op-

posed to mere subjective, personal desire) that the activity in question be
so protected. The reasonable expectation to protect the airspace overlying

the land, however, cannot be demonstrated by measures taken to defend
the land from earthly intrusions . . . ." State v. Roode, 643 S.W.2d 651, 653
(Tenn. 1982). See also United States v. DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. 1078 (W.D.
Mich. 1980) (defendant's property was fenced, posted, and virtually inacces-

sible to land bound searchers, but that was of little concern to the court in
its discussion of the aerial searchers).
152. People v. Joubert, 118 Cal. App. 3d 637, 173 Cal. Rptr. 428 (1981)
(holding that, as a matter of public policy, the court would not recognize a

reasonable expectation of privacy from airborn searches even in rural
areas).
153. State v. Stachler, 58 Hawaii 412, 570 P.2d 1323 (1977) (one growing

crops, whether legal or illegal, has no reasonable expectation of privacy);
State v. Roode, 643 S.W.2d 651 (Tenn. 1982). "There is nothing in ... this
case to indicate that farmers generally expect their cultivated fields to be
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in fenced and posted land regardless of what the land contained;
such expectations have been held as reasonable against both
the landborn and the airborn searcher. 5 4 Similarly, other
courts, while not finding a reasonable expectation of privacy
represented by a specific set of facts, have noted, at least in
dicta, that such expectations of privacy from airborn searches
155
can be reasonable.
Presumptively, the curtilage deserves a higher degree of
protection than the outlying property. However, the curtilage
has suffered similar depredations from airborn searches. The
curtilage's susceptability to airborn searches stems from its
easy accessability. The curtilage, by nature of its definition as
the yards and buildings surrounding the dwelling, is virtually
impossible to protect from the airborn searcher. It would be a
great deal more reasonable to establish the existence of an expectation of privacy by examining the individual's efforts as
they were directed toward terrestrial seclusion. Individuals
should not be required to withdraw into domed enclosures as
their sole protection from airborn intrusions. 56 In Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 157 a federal district court recognized
such an expectation as reasonable. The court held that an expectation of privacy could be manifested without completely
158
shielding the property from the sky.
The EPA, in Dow Chemical, had contracted for a photoconcealed from aerial view, and common knowledge is to the contrary." Id.
at 653.
154. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 536 F. Supp. 1355 (E.D. Mich.
1982) (aerially observed areas of the plant were completely hidden from
ground observers); People v. Sneed, 32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146
(1973) (area observed was fenced off from ground observers).
155. Sneed was the first appellate aerial surveillance case, it has been
widely noted, at least in dicta. See, e.g., People v. Joubert, 118 Cal. App. 3d
637, 173 Cal. Rptr. 428 (1981) (distinguishing Sneed); Burkholder v. Superior
Ct. for County of Santa Cruz, 96 Cal. App. 3d 421, 158 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1979)
(also distinguishing Sneed); Dean v. Superior Ct. for County of Nevada, 35
Cal. App. 3d 112, 110 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1974) (distinguishing Sneed but noting
that reasonable expectations of privacy may extend skyward). To date,
Sneed has not been overruled; at least not specifically. People v. Sneed, 32
Cal. App.3d 535, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1973).
156. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 536 F. Supp. 1355, 1365 (E.D. Mich.
1982).
157. 536 F. Supp. 1355 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
158. "The Fourth Amendment should not be read as to require the citizens or businesses of this nation to take unreasonable measures to protect
themselves from surreptitious governmental searches. This Court is not
prepared to conclude that Dow must build a dome over its entire plant
before it can be said to have manifested an expectation of privacy." Id. at
1365.
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graphic survey of a Dow Chemical facility.' 5 9 The specific target
areas of the airborn photographers were within the facility and
in areas not open to terrestrial surveillance due to intervening
fences and buildings; the enclosure of those areas was motivated, ostensibly, by Dow's desire for secrecy. 160 By using high
magnification cameras, however, the EPA was able to scrutinize
photographs of the uncovered interior areas of the plant for minute details. 16 1 Relying largely on the highly intrusive nature of
the EPA's search and upon the extensive, though ineffectual,
shielding methods employed by Dow, the court stated that actions designed as a bar to the prying eyes of the earthbound
should be considered in analyzing the reasonableness of an
the
airborn search. 162 Applying this reasoning, the court barred
163
EPA from conducting any further aerial surveillance.
Similarly, in People v. Sneed,164 a California appellate court
barred evidence which had resulted from an unreasonable helicopter search. 165 In Sneed, a police helicopter had flown into the
immediate airspace of the defendant's backyard in order to look
for growing marijuana. 166 Sneed's invalidation of the search relied not only on the intrusiveness of the police activity, but also
upon the obtrusiveness of that conduct; the police had flown at
altitudes as low as twenty-five feet.' 67 The Sneed decision is
often quoted but seldom followed; its reasoning was based
largely on the concept that reasonable expectations of privacy
168
are not earthbound, but also extend skyward.
159. The "EPA contracted with Abrams Aerial Survey Corporation, a private company located in Lansing, Michigan, to take aerial photographs.

(EPA] .. .specifically informed Abrams as to the altitude, location, and

direction from which the photographs were to be taken." Id. at 1357.

160. Id. at 1364-65. The court recited fifteen factors which demonstrated
Dow's quest for privacy.
161. Id. at 1357, 1357 n. 2, & 1365.
162. Dow relied largely on the "intent" of the individual; what did the

individual attempt to conceal; the individual being Dow Chemical Company. Id. at 1365.
163. Id. at 1375.
164. 32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1973).
165. In this specific case, the court barred all of the resultant evidence as
well. Id. at 545, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 153.
166. "The deputy sheriff arranged for a helicopter and caused it to be

flown back and forth across the entire 20-acre ranch . . . ." Id. at 540, 108
Cal. Rptr. at 149. "The helicopter hovered as low as 20 or 25 feet. . . ." Id.
167. Id. "While appellant [Sneed] certainly had no reasonable expectation of privacy from his neighbor and his neighbor's permittees and none
from airplanes and helicopters flying at legal and reasonable heights, we
have concluded that he did have a reasonable expectation of privacy to be
free from ... unreasonable governmental intrusion into the serenity and
privacy of his backyard." Id. at 543, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 151.
168. Drawing upon Sneed's reasoning, the court in Dean v. Superior Ct.
for County of Nevada stated that "expectations of privacy are not earth-
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Although in Sneed, the altitude of the helicopter was a factor in the court's decision, it was not determinative. Several
later courts, though, have placed greater significance upon altitude regulations in their determination of the reasonableness of
a search. 169 While the violation of FAA altitude regulations
might be indicative of some governmental unreasonableness, it
is hardly tantamount to a finding of governmental unreasonableness. Similarly, a finding of compliance with FAA regulations
should not be indicative of the inherent reasonableness of a
search. In Sneed, it should be remembered, the offending helicopter was flying at rooftop level, twenty-five feet. This method
of analysis is, most likely, a vestige of trespass law still clinging
to the fourth amendment.
Another major factor in determining the reasonableness of
an airborn search is how that search was conducted. Essentially, there are three methods of aerial search: unaided optical
searching, aided optical searching, and photographic searching.
Unaided optical searching has generally been the presumed
method throughout this comment. Moreover, aided optical
searching has not been of much concern to most courts, because
courts have presumed that if the police can have the advantage
of altitude, they should also be able to "closely" examine the
ground below. 170 Similarly, to offset the disadvantages of aerial
searches, the police often use gyro-stabilizers which correct for
the aircraft's vibrations.' 7' These devices do, in fact, allow the
police to see what they could not otherwise see. The fact that
binoculars may magnify to provide a view equivalent to the view
from a point where the aircraft could not possibly be is of little
concern to most courts. Regarding reasonable expectations of
privacy, it would seem that society should recognize as reasonable, the supposition that no one is watching through binoculars
bound. The Fourth Amendment guards the privacy of human activity from
aerial no less than from terrestrial invasion. * ** [W]e expressly avow what
the Sneed case implie[d]: Reasonable expectations of privacy may descend
into the airspace and claim Fourth Amendment protection." Dean v. Superior Ct. for County of Nevada, 35 Cal. App. 3d 112, 116, 110 Cal. Rptr. 585, 58889 (1974).
169. United States v. Lace, 674 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1982) (airplane always

remained above 1500'); People v. Sneed, 32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 108 Cal. Rptr.
146 (1973) (helicopter went as low as 20'); People v. Lashmett, 71 Ill.
App. 3d
429, 389 N.E.2d 888 (1979) (plane was always above 2000'), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1081 (1980); State v. Roode, 643 S.W.2d 651 (Tenn. 1982) (inadvertant
observation while flying the federally designated airway).

170. People v. St. Amour, 104 Cal. App. 3d 886, 163 Cal. Rptr. 187 (1980)
(gyro-stabilized binoculars maintain a steady field, that is, the image in the
lens remains steady).
171. Id. (court described the use of gyrostabilized binoculars but paid

little attention to whether their use was reasonable).
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from an airplane and that such observations, therefore, should
be recognized as violative of the fourth amendment.
The application of photography to aerial searches is even
more troubling. Initially, photographs were used to show what
the observing police had actually seen.' 72 Photographic
searches, however, have now reached the point where photographs are taken of suspect property, then enlargements of
those photographs may be "searched" in detail. 173 The technological efficiency of this method makes it the most intrusive
174
form of aerial search.
As stated previously, in Dow Chemical the EPA contracted
with a private aerial surveyor for a photographic survey of a
Dow Chemical plant. State-of-the-art cameras were employed
in the survey and the EPA was then able to inspect the resultant
photographs for details resolved at less than one-half of an inch
in diameter. 175 Dow Chemical was the first high-tech aerial surveillance case to be reported and its holding, that the EPA's activities were unreasonable, should be viewed favorably. It is
evidence that some courts recognize that aerial surveillance
may be unreasonable and it may eventually prove to be a significant precedent in the rapidly approaching era of satellite
surveillance.
The Emergence of the High-Tech Search
The fourth amendment and the Supreme Court are slow to
adapt to technological changes; it was not until 1967 that the
Court recognized wiretapping as a search regardless of physical
trespass 76 and the Court has not yet heard a case dealing with
aerial surveillance. Now, before the Court has even examined
an airborn search case, technology has allowed the police to use
satellites as a method of surveillance. The Justice Department
has recently stated that it is now using satellites to photograph
areas within the United States, especially areas within California.' 7 7 The photographs have a high tonal sensitivity which allows for marijuana and coca leaves to be distinguished from
172. State v. Cemper, 209 Neb. 376, 307 N.W.2d 820 (1981) (photos taken to
corroborate officers observations); see also United States v. Dunn, 674 F.2d
1093 (5th Cir. 1982) (photos used to facilitate later intrusion).

173. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 536 F. Supp. 1355 (E.D. Mich. 1982)
(photos taken showed details to one-half inch).
174. See infra notes 176-187 (all satellite surveillance is "photographic").
175. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 536 F. Supp. 1355, 1357 (E.D. Mich.

1982).
176. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); see supra notes 61-83 and

the text accompanying.
177. See supra note 4.
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other folliage. 178 It can be assumed that if the funds become
available, a procedure will be developed whereby the photos will
be computer "read" and then the suspect shadings will be flagged. 179 In this manner, the photographs could be analyzed virtually instantly upon receipt by the police, then a warrant could be
issued, and the police could be dispatched accordingly.
The concern with satellite searches is that they are obviously general searches. They use high resolution photography
which is ostensibly capable of "reading license plates from orbit." 180 The intrusive nature of satellite searches expands upon
the relatively inefficient methods used by the EPA in Dow
Chemical. In holding that the EPA's search was illegal, the district court noted that any other holding would have denied the
existence of any reasonable expectation of privacy outdoors. 181
The recent addition of satellites to the civilian police arsenal
was made possible by changes in federal law. 182 Following the
8 3
Reconstruction Era, the Posse Comitatus Act was passed.
The Act prohibited the use of any part of the military "as a posse
comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws."'1 4 The effect of this
law was to deny the civilian police the use of the military for law
enforcement except as expressly directed by the President. The
Act, however, was amended in 1982 and now allows the military
185
to aid the civilian police in response to requests by the police.
178. See supra note 4.

179. The process of computer flagging essentially involves sensitizing the
computer to a certain tone, then each time that tone registers the computer
will alert the operator. With the current level of sophistication, individual
marijuana plants could be identified. See J. BAMFORD, THE PUZZLE PALACE,

272 (1982); Brecher &Lindsay, Keeping Everybody Honest, NEWSWEEK, Jan.
31, 1983, at 20.
180. Brecher & Lindsay, supra note 179.,
181. 536 F. Supp. 1355 (E.D. Mich. 1982); see also, Dean v. Superior Ct., 35

Cal. App. 3d 112, 110 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1973).
Expectations of privacy are not earthbound. The fourth amendment
guards the privacy of human activity from aerial no less than terrestrial
invasion. At a recent but relatively primitive time a In] X-2 plane could
spy on the ground from 50,000 feet. Today's sophisticated technology
permits overflights by vehicles orbiting at an altitude of several hundred miles. Tomorrow's sophisticated technology will supply optic and
photographic devices for minute observations from extended heights.
Judicial implementation of the fourth amendment needs constant accomodation to the ever intensifying technology of surveillance. Id. at
116, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 588.
182. 10 U.S.C. §§ 371-78 (1982).
183. S.MORRISSON & H. COMMAGER, THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN REPuBLIc II 19-51 (1962).
184. 18 U.S.C. 1385 (1876).
185. ' The Secretary of Defense may, in accordance with other applicable
law, provide ... civilian law enforcement officials [with] any information
collected during the normal course of military operations. . .

."

10 U.S.C.

§ 371. The Defense Department may also "make available any equipment

19841

Aerial Surveillance

The Justice Department has used the 1982 amendment to gain
access to military satellites and other exotic, high-tech military
equipment. This broadening of the statutory authority, while
not irredeemably indicative of the oppressiveness of a policestate, is certainly inconsistent with the traditional separation of
the military from the police in the United States.
Regardless of the benefits that may accrue to law enforcement authorities, the general lowering of each person's individual security irreparably damages the fabric of a free society and
weakens its democratic institutions. An intrusion of the magnitude of satellite surveillance is unwarranted and totally irreconcilable with the fourth amendment. With the advent of satellite
surveillance, reasonable expectations of privacy outdoors may
be limited to overcast days. The alarmists of this ill numbered
year often analogize to George Orwell's Nineteen-Eighty-Four186
and its sinister "big brother," but in this situation, the analogy
possesses an ominous relevance:
In the far distance a helicopter skimmed down between the roofs,
hovered for an instant like a blue bottle, and then darted away
again with a curving
flight. It was the Police Patrol, snooping into
187
people's windows.
CONCLUSION

Drawn from the purposes and history of the fourth amendment, the prohibition against unreasonable searches must be
viewed as a bar to general warrantless searches. The concept
underlying the reasonable expectation of privacy is that, absent
an obvious breach, people are entitled to be left alone by
government.
The right to be left alone demands that absent some provocation, government must refrain from searching people or their
property. Unfortunately, the advent of the airborn search has
given the police a generally unobtrusive disguise. That aerial
surveillance usually rises to the level of a search should be obvious. More often, courts fail to recognize the unreasonable nature of aerial searches. They prefer to become mired in the
analysis of a person's actual skyward manifestation of his expectation of privacy. The first courts dealing with aerial
searches recognized that "reasonable expectations of privacy
were not earthbound."' 188 In analyzing a person's subjective ex*

.

. to any ...

civilian law enforcement official. . .

also Zimmerman, Posse Comitatus,DRUG

."

10 U.S.C. § 372. See

ENFORCEMENT

17 (Summer 1982).

186. See ORWELL supra note 74.
187. See ORWELL supra note 74.
188. People v. Sneed, 32 Cal. App.3d 535, 538, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146, 148 (1973).
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pectation of privacy it must be recognized that any exhibition
will normally be directed towards potential terrestrial intruders;
thus, subjective reasonableness should be measured accordingly. Unfortunately, to satisfy many courts, a total enclosure of
the property would be necessary; no reasonable expectation of
privacy would then be recognized outside of this "super
dwelling."
The most troubling aspect in this field, however, has been
the recent use of satellites by the federal government. Satellites
enormously magnify the intrusive capabilities of the government while remaining wholly unobtrusive. It should be
remembered that the "writs of assistance" were used for apparently laudable purposes: the apprehension and prosecution of
smugglers and the confiscation of smuggled goods. The fact that
aerial and satellite surveillance appear to be motivated by good
intentions is not sufficient to outweigh every individual's fourth
amendment protections. The legitimacy of law enforcement
needs do not justify the violation of the Bill of Rights. The objection to the "writs of assistance" was not that so many were
intruded upon, but rather, they were found objectionable for the
oppressive atmosphere created when citizens are subjected to
the arbitrary and capricious intrusions of the police.
Alan C. Schaefer

